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The Firm as Cartel Manager
Herbert Hovenkamp
64 Vand. L. Rev. 813 (2011)
ChristopherR. Leslie
Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing,
which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act. Section One
condemns only concerted action between separate entities, not
unilateral conduct by a single entity. Firms that engage in price
fixing may try to reduce the risk of antitrustliability by structuring
their actions to appear to be those of a unified single entity that is
beyond the reach of Section One.
In this Article, Professors Hovenkamp and Leslie examine
how price-fixing cartels govern themselves and maximize their
profits by cooperating and colluding, instead of competing. They
then use this cartel theory to explain the recent American Needle
decision, in which the Supreme Court held that the National
Football League ("NFL') is a collaboration among its individual
teams rather than a single entity. Much of the argument by those
favoring single entity status for an organization such as the NFL
confuses the entity question, which is essentially structural,with the
question of cooperation, which is functional or behavioral. Many
markets require firms to cooperate in the delivery of their product
but the need to cooperate does not make the cooperating firms a
single entity immune from Section One liability.
Despite the fact that antitrust law has condemned pricefixing cartels for over a century and the Supreme Court created the
single-entity defense over twenty-five years ago, the link between
cartel theory and the single-entity question remains largely
unexplored. Many successful cartels function by taking control away
from the individual members and giving it to a single organization.
A business organization such as a corporation becomes an ideal
vehicle for cartel management. Understandinghow cartels actually
operate can help courts distinguish between a legitimate single
entity and a centralized cartel structure subject to Section One
liability. This Article uses a series of case studies to illustrate how to
make this distinctionproperly.
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In many markets, competing firms can maximize their profits
by colluding to reduce output and increase price. Fortunately, several
impediments exist to successful cartelization, some practical and
others legal. Practical impediments include the difficulties in getting
rival firms to agree to particular price and output limits and to abide
by their agreements.
Antitrust law represents the primary legal obstacle to price
fixing, which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act.1 Firms
that engage in price fixing may try to reduce their probability of
antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a pricefixing conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities
from antitrust enforcers. Second, because Section One condemns only
concerted action, firms may attempt to structure their relationship to
appear to be the action of a unified single entity that is beyond the
reach of Section One.
Much of the argument for treating an organization such as the
National Football League ("NFL") as a single entity-which is legally
incapable of collusion under Section One of the Sherman Actconfuses the entity question, which is essentially structural, with the
cooperation question, which is functional or behavioral. Many markets
require firms to cooperate in the delivery of their product, in some
2
cases a great deal. This is true of blanket licensing of recorded music,
multiple listing services operated by real estate agencies, 3 and
standard setting by firms in high tech industries, 4 and sports leagues.
But cooperation does not mean these firms are single entities; the
need for cooperation, or even for interconnectivity, requires
application of antitrust's more deferential rule of reason. 5 It does not
1.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
2.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1979) (applying the
rule of reason).
3.
Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding it per se unlawful to use the multi-list process to fix commission rates).
4.
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270-73 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2055 (2009) (holding that standard setting by cellular telephone companies did
not equate to a restraint of trade).
5.
In contrast to the per se rule, pursuant to which restraints that fall in a per se category
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982), in rule-of-reason cases "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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require single entity treatment, however, which effectively immunizes
6
the conduct from output reductions and price increases altogether.
The Supreme Court's Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
decision, which held that a parent and wholly owned subsidiary were
a single entity, grew out of a milieu in which agreements between
independent actors were often subjected to unreasonably harsh
treatment under antitrust's per se rule.7 For example, in the Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp. decision, the Seventh Circuit held that a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary could be guilty of a per se
unlawful conspiracy directed at the plaintiff, one of the defendant's
independent franchisees.8 In such a milieu, in which even purely
vertical conduct was treated very critically, broad single entity
findings made some sense. Today, however, courts are much less likely
to apply the per se rule to anything except naked horizontal conduct.
Joint ventures and purely vertical arrangements are instead
evaluated under the rule of reason, where power and actual
anticompetitive effects must be proven. 9
In American Needle, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the NFL was a "combination" of its individual teams rather than a
single actor for purposes of an antitrust challenge to a single exclusive
licensing arrangement covering all of the teams' individual trademark
rights. 10 The Supreme Court's decision cut through formalities of
business organization to get directly to the question that is important
for antitrust: When is an organization of biological persons,
institutions, or other economic actors a single antitrust "person" and

Under the rule of reason, courts take "into account a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997).
6.
See discussion infra notes 57, 220 and accompanying text.
7.
467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
606 F.2d 704, 725-27 (7th Cir. 1979); cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp.,
8.
392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding that parent and wholly owned subsidiaries could conspire to impose
per se unlawful ties on dealers); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951) (holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent could unlawfully
conspire to impose resale price maintenance on their dealers).
E.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 132 (1998) (holding that a purely
9.
vertical agreement should be evaluated using the rule of reason); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984) (using the rule of reason to analyze a horizontal price
fixing and output limitation where the industry at issue requires horizontal restraints on
competition in order to make their product available).
10. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010).
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when is it a combination? Under the Sherman Act, a "person"'" acting
alone commits a violation only when it "monopolizes" or seriously
threatens to do so. 12 However two or more persons joined together into
a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" can violate the statute
13
whenever they unreasonably "restrain trade."
The American Needle decision could conceivably rest on
alternative rationales for its separate entity conclusion. These are that
(1) the teams are separately owned profit centers capable of competing
with each other; (2) the particular agreement challenged in this case
restrained the ability of the teams to market their IP rights
individually; or (3) the teams themselves acting together actively
made decisions about how their IP rights should be packaged and sold.
The Supreme Court's decision depends on propositions (1) and
(2), but not proposition (3). Indeed, the question of the individual
teams' day-to-day control of sales was not all that important. Rather,
the relevant question was who is controlled. Both lower courts had
strongly emphasized control and so did the NFL in its main brief to
the Supreme Court. The district court observed that the individual
teams had placed their intellectual property rights in trust to NFL
Properties ("NFLP"), and that there was no evidence that this
organization had ever "dealt with any of the teams as independent
organizations."' 4 The Seventh Circuit repeated that point.' 5 The NFL's
merits brief to the Supreme Court emphasized that "[v]irtually every
significant decision about the production and promotion of NFL
Football is controlled by the League" rather than the individual
6
teams.'
For the Supreme Court, however, the important question was
not who controlled NFL Properties. Rather it was that NFLP was
making decisions regarding "the teams' separately owned intellectual
property."' 7 The Court did note that each of the teams owned a share
11. The statute rather unhelpfully defines a "person" as "includ[ing] corporations and
associations existing under or authorized" by law. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
12. Id. § 2 (condemning "every 'person' who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize .... ").
13. Id. § 1 ("Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
...is . . . illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty ... ").
14. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
15. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010).
16. Brief for NFL Respondents at 4, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No.
08-661).
17. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215.
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in NFLP and that they had agreed to cooperate in setting up NFLP in
order to exploit their IP rights; however, without that agreement
"there would be nothing to prevent each of the teams from making its
18
own market decisions."
The Supreme Court also quoted the Ninth Circuit's observation
the business interests of the teams
that " '[a]lthough
'will often coincide with those of the' NFLP 'as an entity in itself, that
commonality of interest exists in every cartel.' "19 The Ninth Circuit's
observation also suggests the importance of who is controlled rather
than who does the controlling. A cartel seeks to maximize the profits
of the cartel group as a whole. By contrast, individual members of the
cartel seek to maximize their own individual profits, which they can
do by undercutting the cartel-typically by producing more than its
cartel output assignment or by charging less than the cartel price. The
question of competitive harm does not depend on who makes the dayto-day price and output decisions, but rather on the cartel manager's
ability to force its price and output decisions upon the individual
members.
In sum, the NFL arrangement was potentially anticompetitive,
not because the individual teams had day-to-day control, but rather
because they lacked it. If each team had relevant control it could have
deviated from the price or output decisions of the group-that is, it
could have cheated on any cartel agreement, something that would
tend to make the cartel fall apart. NFLP as an entity became a very
effective cartel management device precisely because under the
arrangement the individual teams lacked the power to make their own
agreements on the side.
A cartel is an organization of two or more separate firms that
coordinates output or price, although the cartel may coordinate other
aspects of its members' behavior as well. The cartel reduces
20
competition that might otherwise exist among cartel members.
Firms and cartels are both business organizations. Both are
characterized by coordination of output and pricing. The creation and
boundaries of both are economically motivated. A firm is created when
the cost of doing something "internally," or through a hierarchy such
18. Id. at 2214-15.
19. Id. at 2215 (quoting L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir.
1984)).
20. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 402, at 4-7 (3d
ed. 2006) (discussing the nature and consequences of a perfectly competitive economy); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
§§ 4.1-.3, at 146-66 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing cartel price fixing, oligopoly, and collusion).
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as an employment relationship, is cheaper in relation to results than
is use of the market. 2 1 A cartel is created when there are gains to be
had from coordination of output or sales. We describe a cartel as
"snaked" when these gains result entirely (or almost entirely) from
reduced market-wide output and higher prices. Some agreements
among rivals are efficient, however, because they reduce development,
production, or distribution costs. Such agreements can be profitable to
the firms whether or not they have market power and even if they
result in lower prices. We generally characterize these relationships as
"joint ventures" and any restraints on price or output that they might
22
contain as "ancillary."
The lines between firms, cartels, and joint ventures are
notoriously indistinct. For example, several farmers might form a
partnership, which is a purely contractual relationship, if they
consolidate their land, equipment, and operations and produce
everything jointly. In that case the legality of their union would be
analyzed under the law of mergers, but once the organization is
lawfully formed its conduct that does not implicate other firms is
treated as unilateral. 23 The farmers would be a cartel, however, if all
they did was set a price and reduce output while leaving their
operations completely separate. In between is a whole range of
possibilities. For example, they might farm separately but share a
corn picker, truck, or other costly piece of equipment. They might
market jointly through a common sales agent, and this might
necessitate a common price. 24 The antitrust law of ancillary restraints
deals with these issues, typically by assuming that arrangements that

21. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63 (2010), available at http://
www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/content/65031035h363gl64/fulltext.pdf
(examining the relationship between Coasean firms and Coasean markets).
22. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified
and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (explaining the difference between naked and ancillary restraints
and applying the per se rule to the naked restraint at issue); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW,
1906, at 235-42 (2d ed. 2002) (defining and distinguishing naked and
ancillary restraints).
973c, at 63-66 (discussing
23. See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
1202, at 264-83 (explaining
transactional alternatives to mergers and joint ventures); 5 id.
partial asset acquisitions); Gregory H. Werden, Initial Thoughts on the American Needle
Decision, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2010, at 1-7, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publishingantitrustsource/AuglOWerden82f.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the implications
of the American Needle decision); cf. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 1 (2006) (holding it is not
per se illegal for a lawful joint venture to set the prices at which it sells its products).
24. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 375-78 (1933) (upholding
exclusive joint marketing scheme for Depression-era coal).
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unite only a subset of the individual participants' production and
ventures of separate actors
distribution activities are cartels or joint
25
rather than the creation of a single firm.
Part I of this Article discusses the American Needle decision
and how Section One of the Sherman Act does not reach the conduct of
single entities. Part II discusses how cartels operate, including the
many decisions that price-fixing firms need to make and the
operational structures that cartels adopt to make these decisions. Part
III shows how the insights from the study of cartel decisionmaking
structures should inform the application of American Needle to
organizations, mainly corporations, that have some structural
characteristics of single entities, but also have functional
characteristics that threaten price fixing.
I. AMERICAN NEEDLE AND THE SINGLE ENTITY ISSUE

The Sherman Act evaluates anticompetitive conduct differently
depending on whether the challenged restraint is characterized as
concerted or unilateral. Section One of the Sherman Act addresses
anticompetitive conduct that results from concerted action. Because
agreement is required, "unilateral activity by a single firm cannot be
reached via this section." 26 Absent an agreement, there is no case
under Section One. If an agreement is proven, the resulting conduct
can violate Section One if it unreasonably restrains trade.
Section Two of the Sherman Act addresses unilateral conduct
to maintain or acquire a monopoly or to attempt monopolization. The
Supreme Court has explained that "Section 2 makes the conduct of a
single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so."27 Thus Section Two creates a higher threshold for
antitrust liability. The monopolization offense of Section Two of the
Sherman Act requires a dominant firm and an "exclusionary" practice,
which is a practice that destroys a rival or keeps rivals out of the
market, permitting the monopolist to raise its price to monopoly
levels. 28 By contrast, an agreement between two or more separate
"persons" is unlawful when it violates the restraint of trade
formulation of Section One of the Sherman Act, which generally
2100-04, at 3-46 (providing a broad overview of
25. See 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22,
joint ventures).
26. Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 286 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (emphasis added).
651, at 96-130 (defining monopoly
28. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
conduct).
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means that it is reasonably calculated to result in reduced market
output and higher prices. 29 Further, particularly egregious
agreements, such as naked price fixing or boycotts, are said to be
unlawful "per se," which means that an actual output reduction or
price increase need not be proven but will be presumed to result from
the behavior itself. A restraint of trade need not exclude anyone in
order to be unlawful; it must merely lead to higher prices as a result of
reduced output. By contrast, a single firm acting alone may charge as
high a price as it pleases and reduce output accordingly. 30 As a result
of these differences in statutory treatment, antitrust defendants have
a strong incentive to characterize their conduct as unilateral, not
concerted.
One difficult question in Section One jurisprudence has been
determining whether two entities linked by ownership or contract are
legally capable of conspiring for antitrust purposes. For decades, the
Supreme Court had held explicitly and implicitly that a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were legally capable of
agreeing and thus satisfying the first element of a Section One cause
of action.3 1 In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the
Supreme Court overruled this line of cases and held that a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were a single entity for
antitrust purposes. 32 As a result, agreements between them could not
violate Section One.
Lower courts have extended Copperweld's holding to a variety
of scenarios. For example, courts have held that sibling corporations
are incapable of conspiring,3 3 as are a parent and its partially owned
subsidiary in many cases. 34 The circuit courts had split as to whether
the teams in a sports league constituted a single entity or were
29. See 7 id.
1502, at 387-90; 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22,
1912d, at 326-39
(discussing restraint of trade in horizontal trade cases).
30. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
720, at 3-11 (examining why
monopolies are allowed to charge a profit-maximizing price).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116-17 (1975) (finding
conspiracy between a bank and its partially owned branches); United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1947) (finding a conspiracy between a taxicab manufacturing company
and its wholly- or partially-owned operating company subsidiaries); 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 20, at 205-13 (providing a general overview of Supreme Court cases on antitrustrelated conspiracy cases).
32. 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a "single
entity in a parent-subsidiary relationship" is incapable of violating Section One of the Sherman
Act).
34. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
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capable of agreeing and thus satisfying the first element of a Section
One cause of action. Some courts had held that the members of a
professional sports league represented a single entity for many
purposes and, thus, could not run afoul of Section One.3 5 Other courts
have declined to extend Copperweld to shield teams in sports leagues
36
from Section One liability.
The Supreme Court resolved the split in American Needle. The
thirty-two teams that belong to the NFL granted individual exclusive
licenses to their trademarks and related rights to an NFL-formed
company, NFLP. NFLP in turn granted an exclusive license for the
manufacture of caps and headgear bearing these logos to Reebok.
American Needle, which had previously manufactured NFL-logoed
caps, was ousted from this market for ten years by the exclusive
contract. It sued the NFL and its team owners for violating Section
One by engaging in a concerted refusal to deal. Adhering to its
previous decision in ChicagoProfessionalSports,3 7 the Seventh Circuit
held that the NFL was a single entity, and that Copperweld insulated
it and the member teams from Section One liability. 38 The Supreme
Court reversed.
Under Copperweld and its progeny, American Needle was an
absolutely orthodox antitrust decision and the Seventh Circuit's
approach an outlier. The NFL teams were individually owned and had
individual profit centers, 39 employment relationships, 40 productive
assets, and IP rights. To be sure, their principal activity-playing
football for profit-was heavily managed by a central organization,
but under standard, traditional antitrust analysis this would not
35. E.g., Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
professional basketball teams, although separately owned, were more similar to a single entity
than multiple entities for purposes of an antitrust challenge to broadcast contracts); cf. Eleven
Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, 213 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding a single entity
where amateur soccer teams were not separately owned).
36. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that
the teams were distinct entities even though they were commonly owned). For a full discussion of
1467all lower court post-Copperweld decisions, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
69, at 237-58.
37. 95 F.3d at 593.
38. Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 741-44 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010).
39. The NFL historically prohibited both public ownership of the teams as well as crossownership. But see N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
that the NFL cross-ownership ban as applied to non-football teams violated the Sherman Act).
40. While the NFL member teams each hired and competed for players, they engaged in
multi-employer collective bargaining as a group. See Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 234-35
(1996) (describing one instance of the NFL's collective bargaining process).
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change the NFL from a joint venture into a single firm because all of
the business relationships among the individual teams were purely
contractual. 41 The teams could have created alternative business
arrangements. For example, one very large corporation might have
owned all of the NFL teams and operated them as a single entity,
arranging games among them, collecting the revenue, and paying the
players and other staff centrally. In that case there would not be
42
separate profit centers.
In deciding that the NFL was a collaboration rather than a
single entity, the Supreme Court focused on two things, one
essentially structural and one functional. First, the Court considered
whether the organization in question was in fact a union of separate
economic decisionmakers who have some residual and potentially
competing business interests. 43 This inquiry is structural, in the sense
that it asks whether there are multiple profit centers that have
ownership interests that are independent of one another. If no such
separate ownership interests are found, as was true in Copperweld,
44
then we are looking at a single firm.
Given that such separate interests existed, the Supreme Court
next considered whether the particular restraint being challenged
"deprives
the
marketplace
of
independent
centers
of
decisionmaking. 45 That is, the challenged restraint must be one that

41. See, e.g., id. (assuming that NFL teams were a combination of separate actors for
purposes of collective bargaining disputes and finding labor immunity); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (treating NCAA as a combination of its individual teams
and applying the rule of reason to output limitations on national television advertising).
42. E.g. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that the
teams were separate entities notwithstanding common ownership); see also 7 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
1478d3, at 368-77 (discussing the impact of American Needle on
lower courts).
43. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) ("The NFL teams do not possess
either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power
characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams is a substantial, independently owned,
and independently managed business. [Further,] 'their general corporate actions are guided or
determined' by 'separate corporate consciousnesses,' and '[tiheir objectives are' not 'common.' ")
(quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
44. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 753 (1984) (holding a
parent and wholly owned but separately incorporated subsidiary to be a single actor for antitrust
purposes). Justice Stevens, the author of American Needle, dissented in Copperweld. Id. at 77896.
45. Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property.
To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of
valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intellectual property, it is not pursuing
the "common interests of the whole" league but is instead pursuing interests of each "corporation
itself," teams are acting as "separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests," and
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limits the market behavior of these independent economic actors in
some fashion. 46 For example, the NFL clearly qualifies as a
consortium of actors under the structural definition. But suppose that
the antitrust challenge was to an exclusive license given by the NFL
for reproduction of its own "NFL" logo, or perhaps to the NFL's
decision to fire a staff member who worked for the NFL rather than
the member teams. None of the individual teams has an obvious
proprietary interest in the NFL logo or most of the NFL's own
employment decisions. With respect to the NFL logo, they have no
individual rights to license it, and as a result the license agreement
does not limit any right to sell that they would otherwise have.
Treating the NFL as a single entity on that issue might be appropriate
for purposes of licensing the NFL logo, but not for purposes of
licensing the various logos owned by the individual teams. 47 This is
consistent with well-established rules for joint ventures, which find

each team therefore is a potential "independent cente[r] of decisionmaking." Decisions by NFL
teams to license their separately owned trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are
decisions that "depriv[e] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking," and
therefore of actual or potential competition. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld,
467 U.S. at 769, 770) (alterations in original).
46. Id. ("Although NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand,
they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team
trademarks are not necessarily aligned.") (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures
and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52-61, and Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of
Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 69-81
(1987)).
47. See id. at 2214-15 ("[F]or the same reasons the 32 teams' conduct is covered by § 1,
NFLP's actions also are subject to § 1, at least with regards to its marketing of property owned
by the separate teams .... For that reason, decisions by NFLP regarding the teams' separately
owned intellectual property constitute concerted action."). In a footnote the Supreme Court also
found it unnecessary to consider the position of the United States:
For the purposes of resolving this case, there is no need to pass upon the
Government's position that entities are incapable of conspiring under § 1 if they "have
effectively merged the relevant aspect of their operations, thereby eliminating actual
and potential competition . . . in that operational sphere" and "the challenged
restraint [does] not significantly affect actual or potential competition . . . outside
their merged operations." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. The
Government urges that the choices "to offer only a blanket license" and "to have only a
single headwear licensee" might not constitute concerted action under its test. Id., at
32. However, because the teams still own their own trademarks and are free to
market those trademarks as they see fit, even those two choices were agreements
amongst potential competitors and would constitute concerted action under the
Government's own standard. At any point, the teams could decide to license their own
trademarks. It is significant, moreover, that the teams here control NFLP. The two
choices that the Government might treat as independent action, although nominally
made by NFLP, are for all functional purposes choices made by the 32 entities with
potentially competing interests.
Id. at 2216 n.9.
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their activities to be unilateral in some cases but not in others,
48
depending on the nature of the challenged conduct.
The majority's opinion did not address the actual legality of the
collective licensing arrangement. The issue before the Court was
solely whether the teams of the NFL were capable of conspiring. While
the NFL is a legitimate joint venture, the agreement on collective
licensing represents concerted action that falls within the reach of
Section One.
Organization into a single firm for state-law purposes is not
dispositive of the antitrust issue of single entity status. For example,
while partnerships and other unincorporated entities are creatures of
the common law, they can be treated as single entities for antitrust
purposes. 49 Indeed, even much looser organizations of businesses or
individuals bound only by a contract are treated as a single entity for
some purposes. 50 On the other side, American Needle cited both the
Sealy and Topco cases as correctly decided examples of single
incorporated entities that were treated as conspiracies for federal
antitrust purposes. 5 1 Clearly, for example, the members of a cartel
could not avoid Section One of the Sherman Act by creating a
corporation, placing their individual CEOs on the board of directors,
and giving this corporation authority over the individual firm's output
and prices. The CEOs are still independent competitors even if they
occasionally sit around the same boardroom table. As American Needle
indicates, distinguishing a firm from a cartel requires looking beyond
the form of the business organization to more fundamental issues
about how entities make decisions and the economic identities of those

48. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, 1478, at 340-77 (summarizing case law
concerning whether joint venture decisions are unilateral or collaborative).
49. E.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-92 (1922)
(finding an unincorporated labor union to be a single entity); United States v. Greater N.Y. Live
Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 30 F.2d 939, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (holding that an
unincorporated association was covered by the Sherman Act).
50. E.g., Toscano v. PGA, 258 F.3d 978, 983-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating a professional
golfers association as a single entity); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, 213 F.3d
198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (treating a volunteer association of coaches and players as a single
entity); Am. Council of Podiatric Physicians v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, 185 F.3d 606, 62022 (6th Cir. 1999) (treating a professional association of podiatrists as a single entity rather than
a cartel of podiatrists); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding an
association of newspapers better treated as a single entity than as a conspiracy of its member
newspapers); Nat'l Camp Ass'n v. Am. Camping Ass'n, No. 99 Civ. 11853 DLC, 2000 WL
1844764, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2000) (treating an incorporated association of campgrounds
as a single entity).
51. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
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who are controlled. While the question "who is in control" can be
important, usually it is not nearly as important as the question "who
is controlled." For example, in Copperweld the parent firm was almost
certainly in control of the actions of its subsidiary, which was wholly
owned. The reason the Supreme Court found a single firm, however,
was that there was no separately owned entity whose market behavior
was being controlled.
II. CARTEL DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURES
In order to understand how lower courts should apply
American Needle to organizations whose constituents have distinct
profit centers, one must consider how price-fixing cartels, the primary
concern of Section One, operate. This Part reviews the multitude of
decisions that firms in a cartel must make and the various
decisionmaking structures that cartels have adopted.
A. Decisions that Cartels Must Make
Price fixing seems straight forward: rival firms agree to fix a
price above the competitive level. By colluding instead of competing,
the firms in a market can maximize their profits at consumers'
expense. Cartelization, in reality, is far more complicated. The
difference between successful cartels and failed attempts is often a
function of the conspirators' ability to create and implement
appropriate decisionmaking structures.5 2 This Section examines the
multitude of decisions that price-fixing conspirators must make in
order to create and stabilize their illegal cartel. The decisions are
broken into two categories: coordinating the terms of the cartel
agreement and enforcing the agreement once it is made.
1. Coordinating Cartel Terms
Cartels require a great deal of coordination. How explicit the
communications and resulting agreements need to be depends on
market conditions and the nature of the competitors' relationships
with each other.

52. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 86 (2006) ("Successful cartels develop mechanisms for sharing
information, making decisions, and manipulating incentives through self-imposed carrots and
sticks.").
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a. Price
In theory, each cartel has a profit-maximizing price that the
members of the cartel will agree to set. But the theory often
oversimplifies reality for several reasons. First, co-conspirators may
not have the same profit-maximizing price. Differences in firm size,
efficiency, or product can complicate price-fixing negotiations. For
example, firms with lower costs will favor a lower cartel price while
firms with higher costs want a higher price. 53 If the market is product
differentiated there may not be a single optimum price, but it will
have to be a compromise. 54 Because different firms within a cartel may
advocate different price targets, the decision on what price to fix
55
requires a deliberative process and a series of compromises.
Second, even if the members of a cartel share similar cost
structures, which would indicate the presence of a single profitmaximizing cartel price, the conspirators may disagree about whether
to charge it. The fixed price needs to be high enough to maximize
profits, but not so high as to induce new competitors into the market.
56
The decisionmaking calculus for single entities and cartels is similar.
In both situations, the decisionmaker attempts to calculate the profitmaximizing output and price levels. That level is generally determined
by the point at which the firm's marginal cost equals its marginal
revenue. 57 For an individual firm, a firm's board of directors is charged

53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 148 (examining how cartels fix prices); see also
James M. Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience:Any Lessons For OPEC?,in ECONOMICS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF F.G. ADAMS 179, 179-206
(Lawrence R. Klein & Jaime Marquez eds., 1989) (examining the characteristics of fifty-four
different cartels to determine what makes a cartel successful in the long-term).
54. HOVENKAMP, supranote 20, § 4.1, at 148.
55. These price negotiations are dangerous for cartel members because they increase the
risk of detection and consequent criminal penalties. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying
text.
56. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 146-59 (describing the basic economics of price
fixing); David E. Mills & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Cartel Problems: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
938, 940 (1978) (comparing single joint profit-maximizing points with multiple joint profitmaximizing points); D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 841 (1976)
(discussing the effect of single, nonmember firms on cartel pricing); see also George A. Hay &
Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 26-27
(1974) (suggesting that conspiracies are most likely to arise when "numbers are small,
concentration is high, and the product is homogenous").
57. Assuming that all of the individual cartel members have identical costs, the cartel's
profit maximizing output and price are the same as that of a single firm monopolist with the
same cost function. To the extent that cartel members' individual costs differ from one another,
calculation of the optimal output and how it should be assigned is correspondingly more complex.
In general, a monopolist would cut its output by closing its least efficient plants first and
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with maximizing the firm's value, which generally means selling at
the profit-maximizing output and price. 58 For a cartel, the conspirators
make a similar calculation, either through a participatory process or a
centralized decisionmaker.
Third, in addition to fixing list price, some cartel pricing
structures allow for quantity or other discounts. 59 Firms may find
agreements on list price relatively easy to reach, but then face heated
disagreements about the nature of discounts. 60 Over time, some
cartels, such as the copper plumbing tubes cartel, try to simplify the
61
operations by reducing the availability of discounts and rebates.
After cartelizing the three-billion dollar worldwide market for
graphite electrodes, the members of that cartel eliminated discounts
altogether. 62 Additionally, international cartels must make allowances
63
for currency exchange rate issues.
Further complicating the pricing decisions, many cartels have
had to negotiate and fix multiple prices. For example, the citric acid
and plasterboard cartels had to routinely agree to two sets of prices,
one for preferred larger customers and a higher one for other
customers. 64 Other cartels-including those in electrical and
mechanical carbon and graphite products-have employed far more
complicated price schedules that "allowed for many different prices
depending on the particular characteristics of the product and the

producing the residual output only from the lowest cost facilities. As a practical matter, a cartel
may not have that option because it could entail that some high-cost members shut down
completely.
58. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 20-22 (9th
ed. 2007) (discussing present value and the opportunity cost of capital); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 373, 386
(2009) (discussing the Coasean vision of the firm as a profit-maximizer); Michael C. Jensen,
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 9 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=220671 (proposing a new system for value maximization called enlightened value
maximization).
59. Joseph E. Harrington, How Do Cartels Operate?, 2 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS
MACROECONOMICS 1, 12 (2006).
60. Id. at 15 ('CThough there did not appear to be much disagreement among firms over
price, there is a well-documented episode of disagreement with regards to discounts. In the
isostatic graphite cartel, members disagreed about the 20% discount to machine shops and
distributors; the source of the disagreement appeared to be the different composition of cartel
members' demands.").
61. Id.
62. Robert D. Paul & J. Mark Gidley, Price Fixing Begins to Hit Bottom Line, LEGAL TIMES,
May 4, 1998, at S44.
63. Harrington, supranote 59, at 12.
64. Id. at 7, 15.
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buyer."65 Similar to the international vitamin cartel of the 1990s, the

heavy equipment cartel of the 1950s was actually a series of
overlapping, multi-faceted cartels involving upwards of forty
manufacturers selling expensive equipment in more than twenty
66
product lines.

Many cartels must also coordinate the timing of their
announcements of higher prices. Simultaneous price increases could
draw the attention of antitrust authorities. Cartels sought to decrease
this risk by staggering their price hikes. For example, after fixing the
prices for the upcoming year, the corporate officials who ran the
international vitamins cartel also agreed on who would announce each
price increase and the date of each announcement. 67 Other cartels
employed "a clear orchestration of who would move first and when
other firms would follow which could be in days, weeks, or even
months. This has been documented for cartels in carbonless paper,
electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products, copper
68
plumbing tubes, fine arts auction houses, and sorbates."
These negotiations could be difficult because no firm wants to
be the first to announce a price increase. Being seen as aggressive
regarding price hikes can create a public relations problem. In the lag
time between price announcements, the later-moving firms can take
sales from the price leader. 69 This temporary asymmetry could
destabilize a cartel. For example, in the auction house price-fixing
conspiracy, Christie's had agreed to be the first to announce a new
nonnegotiable minimum commission and then lost a major
consignment to its co-conspirator who had not yet announced the same
nonnegotiable term. 70 This led the CEO of Christie's to fear that his
71
cartel partner at Sotheby's "was doublecrossing him."

Because cartels often experience cheating by their members,
merely fixing the price of the product is often insufficient on its own to
create a stable cartel. 72 Empirically, cartel members frequently cheat

65. Id. at 7.
66. Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organizationof Conspiracy: Illegal
Networks in the Heavy ElectricalEquipment Industry, 58 AM. SOC. REV, 837, 838 (1993).
67. Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 715 (2001).
68. Harrington, supra note 59, at 20-21.
69. Id. at 24.
70.

CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBY'S-CHRISTIE'S

AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL 166 (2004).
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 96-100 (discussing cartel cheating and common responses).
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by honoring the cartel price on the product at issue, but then granting
a discount on a complementary good or service. For example, cartel
member firms may charge the cartel price but provide delivery service
at a loss, thereby effectively selling the cartelized product at a
discount.7 3 Cartels have responded to this risk by regulating collateral
prices or services as well. For example, the sugar cartel "regulated
storage rates, freight rates, delivery times, and delivery methods, all
to prevent hidden price cuts from being buried in the details." 74 The
cement cartel forbade its members from using trucks, and enlisted
cooperative railroad officials to help enforce price fixing in the cement
industry.7 5 Also, under the cement cartel code, "the cement producers
were also barred from competing through different ways of wrapping
and shipping their product or through making different charges or
allowances for cement bags." 76 More recently, in the auction house
price-fixing conspiracy, in addition to fixing nonnegotiable
commissions, the members also sought to prevent waivers of related
expenses, including catalog illustrations, shipping, and insurance
charges. 77 Similarly, the firms in the industrial and medical gases
cartel adopted minimum transport charges and imposed a new drop
charge on bulk deliveries in order to prevent circumvention of the
cartel price through discounted delivery.7 8 In addition to price, the
scope of these ancillary agreements had to be negotiated and agreed
79
upon by all cartel members.
In some cases, cartel members developed complicated pricing
formulas that cover a range of products and buyers. The electrical and
mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel provides an example:
The most important purpose of the cartel was to agree on the prices to be charged to
customers in different countries for the many different varieties of electrical and
mechanical carbon and graphite products. For this purpose, the cartel members first
agreed on a pricing method which calculated the sales price by reference to a number of
factors. The basis of the scheme was the calculation of the price for carbon brushes.

73. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust,and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 624 (2004).
74. Id. at 579 (citing David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and
Collusion: NarrativeEvidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 383 (2001)).
75. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE BASING-POINT
CONTROVERSIAL PRICING PRACTICE 201 (1949).

SYSTEM:

AN

ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS

OF

A

76. Id. at 80 (citing Brief in Support of the Complaint at 414-22, Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (No. 3,167)) ("It was against the rules of the Compendium, for
example, to grant allowances for cloth sacks when they were not returned in good order.").
77. MASON, supra note 70, at 169.
78. Harrington, supranote 59, at 12.
79. See id. at 6 ("Collusion also extended to prices for ancillary services and non-price
dimensions in order to avoid cheating through these avenues.").
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These were divided into three groups: industrial brushes, midget brushes and
of the carbon or graphite
exceptions. Within each of the first two groups, the volume 80
material in question would be determined in cubic centimetre.

Pricing agreements with several moving parts required more
involved negotiation and renegotiation than simple cartels involving a
homogenous product in a single market.
In some markets, price fixing takes the form of bid rigging.
This is more complicated than fixing a single price. For each contract,
the cartel members must decide which cartel will have the lowest bid,
what it will be, and what the remaining cartel members will bid in
order to lose the contract. The failure to execute this properly can
expose the cartel. For example, the heavy equipment cartel of the
1950s and 1960s was discovered when a reporter culled through the
purchasing records of the Tennessee Valley Authority and noticed that
"at least 47 large and small American manufacturers have taken part
in identical bidding on a wide variety of items in the past three
years.18 1 To prevent exposure, bid riggers assign bids and agree to
rotate the winning bids in a manner that does not raise suspicion.
b. ProductionLimits and Market Allocation
Many cartels find it preferable to set output or sales limits
either instead of or in addition to fixing the price.8 2 Some cartels set

80. Id. at 9-10 (quoting EMCG-EC2, 91-3).
81. JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN
THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 29 (1962). The record in the Cement Institute case two decades prior
to the heavy equipment cartel had produced the following set of bids on a job sought by the
United States Engineer Office, Tucumcari, New Mexico, April 23, 1936, all identical to the one
ten-thousandth cent per barrel:
Name of
Bidder

Price
per Bbl.

Name of
Bidder

Price
per Bbl.

Monarch
Ash Grove
Lehigh
Southwestern
U. S. Portland Cement Co.

$3.286854
3.286854
3.286854
3.286854
3.286854

Oklahoma
Consolidated
Trinity
Lone Star
Universal
Colorado

$3.286854
3.286854
3.286854
3.286854
3.286854
3.286854

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 713 n.15 (1948). See generally Vernon A.
Mund, Identical Bid Prices,68 J. POL. ECON. 150, 150 (1960) (discussing identical bid process).
82. See, e.g., SIMON N. WHITNEY, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONTROL 70 (1934)
(discussing the cotton cartel).
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limits on output, others on inputs. For example, the Cotton-Textile
Institute had its members pledge to limit their day shifts to fifty-five
hours per week, and their night shifts to fifty.8 3 Depending on the
relative efficiency of the various cartel members, firms may advocate
very different limits.
Assuming that total production limits are agreed to, pricefixing firms must then decide how to apportion the total quantity
produced.8 4 Output must be allocated among cartel members, and
there may not be a single equilibrium solution that simultaneously
maximizes the profits for every cartel member. That is, the size of
total output is measurable by reference to market demand, but the
division of the cartel surplus represents a problem similar to that of a
bilateral monopoly.8 5 There is no "natural" solution. Intuitively,
perfectly identical firms might divide the output equally, but that
would not necessarily be the case and, in any event, firms always
differ from one another. Smaller firms will tend to want to see output
divided evenly; larger ones will want it to be divided in proportion to
historical output. When historical output is used, firms may disagree
about which years to use as the reference period, some preferring the
previous year and others a range of years. S6 Each firm presumably
angles to select a time frame that maximizes the firm's future sales at
the cartel price. Finally, newer firms may advocate productive
allocations,
capacity instead of historical sales as the basis for cartel
87
again because they fare better under such a measure.
Additionally, some cartels allocate specific customers.8 8 For
example, to stabilize the various vitamin cartels, Roche and Rhone-

83. Id. at 71 ('This plan, proposed in January, 1930, and accepted by practically 75% of the
industry within four months, continued in force until July, 1933."). In one well known antitrust
decision, the National Window Glass Manufacturers association reached an agreement under
which one group of firms operated for six months of the year while the other group operated for
the other six months. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes approved the agreement as a
reasonable way of allocating a shortage of laborers. Nat'l Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United
States, 263 U.S. 403, 413 (1923).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing volume
allocation in the lysine cartel).
85. See ROGER D. BLAIR AND JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
(forthcoming 2011) (noting that in a bilateral monopoly, the output is typically determinable, but
the division of the surplus is indeterminate and must be negotiated); Hovenkamp, supra note 21,
at 15.
86. Harrington, supra note 59, at 28-30 (discussing examples in copper plumbing tubes,
organic peroxides, vitamins A and E, folic acid, and citric acid cartels).
87. Id. at 31 (discussing lysine cartel).
88. Id. at 6, 24.
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Poulenc agreed not to pursue certain customers.8 9 Such agreements
are relatively common in cartels. 90 Customer allocation agreements
stabilize a cartel by reducing the ability and the incentive to cheat. 91
In the case of a particularly large customer, cartel members may agree
to share a customer, for example by taking turns as to who gets the
contract.92 In such a case, the conspiring firms had to negotiate how to
93
rotate the contract in a manner that did not look too suspicious.
c. CoordinatingArtificial Standards
In addition to-or as a prelude to-fixing price, some firms also
standardize their product lines with those of other cartel members. In
markets with homogeneous products, cartels are more stable. 94 It may
be hard to agree upon a single set price when the firms in a cartel sell
products of varying quality and sizes. Further, cheating may be
harder to detect when firms are selling more diverse products. This
reduces the life of a cartel. 95 To address these problems, some cartels
attempt to standardize their products. 96 For example, the turn-of-thecentury cement cartel standardized the minimum specifications and
members declined to "accept[ ] specifications calling for better

89. DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 233 (2004).
90. Harrington, supra note 59, at 37 (discussing the chlorine and chloride cartel).
91. See BOIES, supra note 89, at 233 ("By assigning particular customers to particular
suppliers, the conspirators reduce the incentive suppliers have to depart from the agreed price in
search of more sales.").
92. Harrington, supra note 59, at 40 (discussing zinc phosphate cartel).
93. Id.
94. Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 247 (1996)
("As predicted by theory, cartels tended to export relatively homogeneous, less highly processed
commodities."). On product standardization agreements facilitating collusion, see 13 HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 2136, at 231-32 (2d ed. 2005).
95. Dick, supra note 94, at 250 ("For example, cartels covering slightly more differentiated
products such as textiles and office equipment dissolved after members discovered that 'foreign
market development could be better handled on an individual basis.").
96. E.g., United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 185 (3d.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (defendants eliminated lower quality bathroom
fixtures that had been subject to heavy discounting); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States,
197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952) (defendants standardized fire
extinguishers in order to facilitate bid rigging); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (defendants standardized milk containers in order to
facilitate bid rigging, and court stated, "it was easier to reach the goal of uniform prices on a
standard product than on one which was not"); see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 644-45 (1980) (per curiam) (standardization of credit terms); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n
of N. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1960) (standardization of trade-in
allowances on used cars); see also Harrington, supra note 59, at 5-8.
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qualities." 97 Alternatively, cartels may agree to limit the varieties of a
product available for sale. For example,
[tihe approach of having standardized products was also taken in the graphite
electrodes cartel as the firms: "agreed to charge certain premiums on the price of largesize electrodes, namely a surcharge on the price charged for standard 24-inch electrodes
(for example, a 10% premium for 28-inch electrodes and a 40% premium for 30-inch
electrodes)." 9 8

Such agreements can lead to tension when a cartel member
seeks to introduce a slightly different product, as when one firm
destabilized the graphite electrodes cartel by introducing a 28.75-inch
model at the 28-inch model price. 99 The coordination of the artificial
standards helps stabilize the cartel but restricts the ability of member
firms to develop new products. Based on their individual research
agendas, different firms may advocate different standards.
Disagreements over product size and quality can disrupt a cartel. 100
d. Renegotiation
Even when rival firms can come to an initial agreement, the
need for renegotiation means that coordination issues remain for the
life of a cartel. Disagreements within cartels are common.10 1 Over
time, smaller firms may demand larger allotments. 0 2 In order to keep
a cartel continuing, a firm may agree to sacrifice some of its market
share to a cartel partner.10 3 The inability to agree on new prices and
volume allocations, in light of changing market conditions and cartel
10 4
firm demands, can result in a cartel dissolving.
Cartel negotiations are perilous because every firm at the table
has the same leverage: decline to participate in the conspiracy and
nobody reaps cartel profits. Price-fixing conspiracies differ from other
97. MACHLUP, supra note 75, at 80 (citing Brief in Support of the Complaint at 414-22, Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (No. 3,167)).
98. Harrington, supra note 59, at 9 (quoting Graphite electrodes EC, 56).
99. Id. at 9.
100. See, e.g., Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary InternationalCartels
and Developing Countries: Economics Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 835-36 (2004) (discussing disagreements within the graphic electrodes
cartel).
101. Id.; Larry R. Stewart, Canada'sRole in the InternationalUranium Cartel,35 INT'L ORG.
657, 663 (1981) (discussing disagreements within the uranium cartel).
102. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 31 (discussing dispute within lysine cartel).
103. See id. at 33 ('Though stability of market shares was common, it was not universal. In
negotiating in 1992 in the market for vitamin B2, Roche agreed to allow BASF's market share to
rise from 35% in 1990 to 38% by 1994.').
104. See Dick, supranote 94, at 249-50 (discussing potash cartel).
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conspiracies in that the market determines the necessary participants.
In a traditional conspiracy-say, bankrobbing-if the driver of the
getaway vehicle backs out, the remaining conspirators can bring in
another driver. In a price-fixing conspiracy, if a firm that supplies a
significant market share (or has the productive capacity to do so)
departs, then the cartel cannot achieve its aims because when the
remaining conspirators reduce output and increase price, the
nonmember firm can supply the unmet the demand. Because a firm's
exit from the cartel means the cartel will dissolve, cartel negotiations
take place under mutual threats of withdrawal. Every firm has the
dual incentive to make demands in order to maximize its return and
to accommodate cartel partners' demands to prevent exit.
2. Enforcement of the Agreed-Upon Terms
Rival firms agree to fix prices because it increases their
expected profits. Another course of conduct increases profits even
further: joining a cartel and then cheating by selling more than one's
cartel allotment and/or charging less than the cartel-fixed price. 10 5
When a cartel is reducing its output and raising price to the cartel's
maximizing level, each individual cartel member's marginal revenue
is greater than its marginal cost; that is, each cartel member is
earning more per unit sold than the incremental cost of furnishing
that unit. While this proposition is readily proven mathematically, it
is also quite intuitive. 10 6 The output and price of a perfectly
functioning monopolist and a perfectly functioning cartel are identical.
That is, whatever the profit-maximizing price is for the monopolist,
the cartel maximizes its aggregate profits by setting output and price
to that level, and then dividing up the output among the members. If
the monopolist cuts price from the monopoly level, it loses money
because the price cut on its entire output is greater than the amount
of additional profits it earns by producing more. For example, if the
profit-maximizing output and price are one hundred units at ten
dollars per unit, a price cut to nine dollars is necessarily unprofitable
even though sales rise to 108 units, because the additional profits from
the increased sales are more than offset by the lost profits from the
price reduction.

105. Leslie, supra note 73, at 526.
106. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 149-50; FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 244-45 (3d ed. 1990).
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The individual cartel member is in a different position,
however. Suppose that the cartel has ten identical members and each
one is producing ten of these one hundred units at the profitmaximizing price. Now one cartel member surreptitiously lowers its
price to nine dollars, bringing the eight extra units into the market.
For the monopolist, the output increase resulting from the price cut
was eight percent, but for the single member of a ten-identical firm
cartel it is eighty percent, making it far more likely to be profitable.
Further, that is not the entire story. The cheater's price cut will
induce some existing customers within the one-hundred units to
switch away from their seller and to the cheater, giving the cheater an
even larger output increase. Of course, the success of all of this
depends on the cheater's ability to cut the price while the other cartel
members hold their position. If the cheating is detected, or if other
members decide to cheat as well, the cartel is likely to fall apart and
10 7
competition will break out.
In sum, each individual cartel member has an incentive to
"cheat" on the cartel by producing more than its assigned output.
Stories of such cartel cheating are common, 0 8 and this excess of
individual firm marginal revenue over marginal cost is one of the
principal reasons that cartels become unstable and fall apart, even
when they are legal. 10 9 The absence of effective enforcement
mechanisms has led to the demise of many cartels. 1 0
Consequently, successful cartels develop mechanisms for
detecting and punishing cheating. Common methods for detecting
deviations from a cartel agreement include requiring all cartel
members to report their sales figures, utilizing auditors, and
employing an independent cartel administrator."' Once cheating is
identified, the cartel must discipline the defecting firm in order to

107. On cartel cheating and the relationship between the size of the markup and the
likelihood of cheating, see GEORGE M. STOCKING & MYRON M. WATKINS, CARTELS OR
COMPETITION? 94 (1948).
108. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1018 (1988) (noting that, for example, in the railroad
industry, both collusion and cheating were widespread during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
109. See Robert H. Porter, On the Incidence and Durationof Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON.
415, 416-18 (1985) (writing on price wars as cartel destabiizers).
110. Dick, supra note 94, at 249 ("Webb-Pomerene cartels dissolved under two general sets of
circumstances. The first were enforcement failures. Many price-fixing cartels were undermined
by their failure to detect and punish members' attempts to undercut the agreed-on price or to
exceed quota allocations.").
111. Leslie, supra note 73, at 611-15.
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make the lapse nonprofitable and to deter future transgressions. Some
cartels employ price wars. 112 The more common approach, however, is
to have accounting and reimbursement among the affected cartel
members. Many cartels employ buyback programs to deal with firms
that sell more than their cartel allotment. For example, as part of the
agreement by members of the citric acid cartel, to balance the cartel
books at the end of 1991, one firm that sold too much, Haarmann &
Reimer, was required to buy 7,000 tons of citric acid from ADM, which
had sold less than its cartel allotment. 113 While effective, buyback
schemes require "'continuous monitoring' to assess how sales matched
up with quotas."114 In short, the cartel's enforcement mechanism
requires constant coordination.
3. Summary
In sum, cartels require an extreme amount of coordination
about issues beyond the mere fixing of a price. While every cartel faces
its own problems in formation and continuity, the international
graphite electrodes cartel is fairly typical for successful, profitable
cartels:
According to the U.S. Department of Justice's investigation, cartel members agreed to:
(1) increase and maintain prices, (2) eliminate price discounts, (3) allocate volume
among conspirators, (4) divide the world market among themselves and designate the
price leader in each region, (5) reduce or eliminate exports to members' home markets,
(6) restrict capacity, (7) restrict non-conspirator companies' access to certain graphite
electrode manufacturing technology, (8) exchange sales and customer information in
order to monitor and enforce the cartel agreement, and
(9) issue price announcements
1 15
and price quotations in accordance with the agreement.

The amount, difficulty, and variety of coordination issues can
speed the demise of the price-fixing cartel. In his empirical study of
export cartels, Andrew Dick noted that "cartels ... dissolved when
11 6
their coordination costs outweighed their service value to members.
Consequently, firms must develop cost-effective ways to
negotiate, implement, and enforce their cartel agreements. A common

112. See id. at 618-20 (discussing examples); see also Harrington, supra note 59, at 63 ("In
the carbonless paper cartel, cartel member AWA had a market share in Europe of 30-35% and
was the largest producer with capacity exceeding twice that of any other firm. It used its
dominant position in the market to threaten aggressive pricing if firms did not comply with the
collusive agreement.") (internal citations omitted).
113. Harrington, supra note 59, at 57-58.
114. Id. at 58 (discussing the citric acid and vitamins A and E cartels).
115. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 833 (citation omitted).
116. Dick, supranote 94, at 250.
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feature of these structures is that they often minimize the role of
individual cartel members in making day-to-day output or price
decisions, assign it to an entity that has the power to determine the
profit-maximizing rate, and impose it on the individual members. The
entity may be owned by the cartel members or have cartel members on
its acting board, but none of this is essential and it may be
counterproductive to the extent that the incentives of individual
members diverge from those of the cartel as a whole. As the Supreme
Court observed in American Needle, the interests of the individual
117
teams are "not necessarily aligned" with those of the NFL as a body.
B. The Structures of Cartel Decisionmaking
In order to coordinate the many aspects of a price-fixing cartel,
member firms need to craft a process for making decisions. In a pricefixing conspiracy with only two cartel partners, such as the auction
house cartel, the decisionmaking is necessarily democratic to the
extent that all decisions must be negotiated and agreed to by every
cartel participant.1 1 8 As the number of conspirators rises, however, the
fixed price can be reached by consensus, by committee, or by a
centralized agent to whom price-setting authority has been delegated.
This Section reviews the various decisionmaking schema employed by
cartels. Cartels range from relatively democratic to more centralized.
On either side of this spectrum, successful cartels construct a
sophisticated organizational structure to gather information, to make
decisions, and to communicate and enforce their diktats.
1. Democratic Cartels
While economic theory suggests that cartels should be difficult
to form and maintain in industries with a large number of
competitors, price-fixing cartels do exist in such markets. 19 In the
vast majority of these cases, an industry trade association is used to
run the conspiracy. 120 At the beginning of the twentieth century, firms

117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010).
118. Following an agreement between the chairmen of Sotheby's and Christie's, the CEOs of
the two rival firms met and fixed commissions, among other cooperation. MASON, supra note 70,
at 122-23, 133-34.
119. See Hay & Kelley, supra note 56, at 21 (indicating that there are many cases in which
larger groups conspire).
120. Id. at 21 ("In seven out of eight [cartel] cases with more than fifteen firms in the
conspiracy, a formal industry trade association was involved.").

838

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3:813

in many industries formed trade associations "to avoid ruinous
competition" and increase prices. 121 In some cases, firms in trade
associations have sought to both increase market price and to cut
22
wages to their workforce. 1
For many cartels, their illegal summits transpired after a
legitimate meeting of their trade association. Examples are cartels in
school milk, 123 carbonless paper, 124 citric acid, 125 lysine, 126 choline
chloride, 127 copper plumbing tubes, 128 turbines, 129 and other heavy
equipment. 130 The presence of a trade association can give the illusion
of legitimacy to competitor meetings.' 3 ' The trade association provided

121. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 321 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1991) (citing ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 121, 82 (1914)); see WHITNEY,
supra note 82, at 40 ("[E]arly trade associations were little more than permanent pools.').
122. See WHITNEY, supra note 82, at 78 (discussing the Institute of Carpet Manufacturers of
America).
123. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 413, 429 n.44 (1996) ("In the Western Kentucky case, according to testimony by industry
witnesses, the bid-rigging arrangements were hatched at meetings of the Western Kentucky
Dairy Products Association, which were usually held in conjunction with or following meetings of
the Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly Commission.").
124. Harrington, supra note 59, at 75. ("In the carbonless paper cartel, general planning
meetings were conducted under the cover of the meetings of the Association of European
Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper.") (internal citation omitted).
125. See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 134-35 (2001) (discussing European
Citric Acid Manufacturers' Association and the citric acid cartel); KURT EICHENWALD, THE
INFORMANT 3 (2000) (discussing how the cartel had "formed bogus industry associations as a
cover for [its] illegal meetings").
126. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 220 (discussing the "formation of a formal lysine association
to facilitate the conspiracy").
127. Id. at 316 (discussing how a meeting between the manufacturers turned into an
agreement "to raise the North American price of choline chloride"); Harrington, supra note 59, at
75-76 ("With choline chloride, meetings were generally (though not exclusively) scheduled either
before or after the meetings of the European Chemical Industry Council.") (internal citation
omitted).
128. Harrington, supra note 59, at 76 ("Coordination with trade association meetings also
took place with cartels in copper plumbing tubes.") (internal citation omitted).
129. Robert R. Faulkner, Eric R. Cheney, Gene A. Fisher & Wayne E. Baker, Crime by
Committee: Conspiratorsand Company Men in the Illegal ElectricalIndustry Cartel, 1954-1959,
41 CRIMINOLOGY 511, 530 (2003).
130. JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 315 (1962) (noting that cartel "meetings were
incidental to technical gatherings").
131. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 202 ("ADM proposed forming a world lysine association
that would meet on a regular basis. The new association would collect and distribute mostly
production and market-share information, much like the Corn Refiners Association did for the
U.S. corn wet milling products (Tr. 1734-36). Wilson also suggested that, like the European
Citric Acid Manufacturers' Association, the new association would provide a convenient cover for
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the cover for the illegal meetings because it explained why competitors
were disclosing monthly sales to a common central body 132 and why
rival executives and salespeople were gathering together. 13 3 In sum,
the trade association provides the structure for cartel decisionmaking,
the cover for why competitors are gathering, and "may also foster a
social climate conducive to collusion." 134 All of this facilitates a
relatively democratic decisionmaking process for the cartel.
Of course, not all trade associations are fronts for illegal
activity. Most engage in useful activities. 135 Legitimate trade
associations generally employ relatively democratic processes. They
engage in rulemaking and standard setting in a relatively open
fashion. 36 This may in some cases, however, provide a forum for price
fixing or market division.
Cartels may assume the democratic decisionmaking structure
of their corresponding trade association. In more participatory cartels,
the monitoring and enforcement processes are done relatively
collectively, with much involvement and discussion among the cartel
members. For example, some cartels had twenty-five face-to-face
meetings among their conspirators before being discovered and
prosecuted. 37 Many cartels had face-to-face meetings every month or

illegal price-fixing discussions (Tr. 2186). In a year or two, a lysine association in fact emerged
that met quarterly and performed the two functions that Wilson proposed.").
132. EICHENWALD, supra note 125, at 205 ("That's where the scheme came in. No one would
question why each company had collected monthly sales data if it was turned over to the
association. Then secretly, the companies could swap the numbers among themselves to enforce
the volume agreement.").
133. Harrington, supra note 59, at 76 ("Scheduling to convene the cartel at a trade
association meeting is obviously convenient-as many of the executives are to be there anywaybut it also serves the purposes of avoiding detection of the cartel. The trade association meeting
provides a cover for why executives of competing firms are all at the same venue.").
134. Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 39 (1977).
135. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 233-34

(2000) ("Routine activities include publications containing useful general information about the
industry and about technological and governmental developments affecting it, lobbying
activities, standard setting, safety and other 'seal of approval' programs, providing media for
arbitration, intra-industry promotion and advertising, and the publication of industry
statistics.').
136. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 137

(2005) (stating that trade associations "also engage in rule making and standard setting for their
industries" and that "the great majority of trade associations' activities are procompetitive").
137. See CONNOR, supra note 125, at 135 ('There were about 25 face-to-face meetings of the
[citric acid cartel] and about a dozen bilateral meetings (Tr. 2614-2801)."); HERLING, supra note
130, at 315 (discussing one of the heavy equipment cartels).
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quarterly.13 8 The members of the Linseed cartel had to attend monthly
meetings and were fined if they missed one. 139 Some cartels, such as
the district heating pipes cartel, had to increase the frequency of their
meetings when the need to allocate new customers and new projects
necessitated more group decisions. 140 Similarly, the turbine cartel had
to meet more frequently when it had more data to process. 141 Scholars
have theorized that economic turbulence could necessitate more cartel
meetings because "frequent negotiations among colluders are
necessary when market conditions are unstable and uncertain."'142 In
addition to face-to-face meetings, cartels have used weekly phone calls
and faxes to exchange information such as sales data. 143 Because
cartels make a multitude of decisions that need regular renegotiation
and firms must monitor their cartel partners, frequent communication
is necessary. 144 In democratic cartels, the member firms discuss price
openly and come to agreement following discussion. 45 When done on
the heels of a legitimate meeting, the administrative structure of the
illegal cartel could take advantage of the previous decisionmaking
rules of trade association meeting.
Some cartels develop sophisticated managerial structures that
lend themselves to organizational charts. For example, some cartels
maintained an all-inclusive, worldwide group while forming regional
subgroups. 146 In one case, "[t]he switchgear conspiracy was organized
in a decentralized fashion.... [The] general managers set price-fixing

138. See HERLING, supra note 130, at 104 (noting one heavy equipment cartel whose working
group "met on an average of once every six to eight weeks"); Harrington, supra note 59, at 55
('The lysine, zinc phosphate, and citric acid cartels monitored on a regular monthly basis."); id.
("In the case of the vitamin B5 cartel, firms initially reported sales data on a quarterly basis but
later chose to do it on a monthly basis.").
139. BENJAMIN S. KIRSH, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN LAW AND BUSINESS 113-14 (1938).

140. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 74-75 (discussing how meetings to implement an
allocation of sales quotas have "a frequency dictated by the flow of new projects and customers").
141. Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 840-41.
142. Id. at 841.
143. Harrington, supra note 59, at 75 ("Most cartels exchanged information-generally
regarding sales-on a monthly or quarterly basis with some doing it as often as weekly through
phone or fax rather than face-to-face meetings."); Id. at 55 ("While the vitamins A and E cartel
met monthly for monitoring purposes, they communicated weekly by phone.").
144. See id. at 81 ('To implement such a complex arrangement, some cartels created an
impressive organizational structure that entailed frequent communication and face-to-face
meetings.").
145. See, e.g., HERLING, supra note 130, at 33 (discussing the heavy electrical manufacturing
cartel).
146. See Harrington, supra note 59, at 77 ("Other cartels organized themselves into both a
general group-comprised of all cartel members-and regional sub-groups.").
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policy and delegated execution of the details to a 'working-level' group
of subordinates."' 147 Similarly, the graphite electrodes "cartel was
organized into a 'top-level' group and a 'working-level' group. The toplevel meetings included primarily company presidents and managing
directors and were designed to set policies. Lower-level managers, who
met more frequently, worked out the details of the agreement and its
148
implementation."
2. More Centralized Cartel Decisionmaking Structures
On the other end of the spectrum are cartels that are not
democratic in the sense that the members have ceded decisionmaking
authority on prices, output, and/or customer allocation to another
entity. "Democratic" cartels, in which each cartel member has a voice
in daily administration, can in fact be quite unwieldy. 149 Cartel
stability often requires that the managerial role be given to one or two
ringleaders or an organization with centralized decisionmaking
authority. 15 0 Such an organizational form can reduce the agency costs
of cartel management by controlling the diverse preferences of
15
individual cartel members. '

147. Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 839.
148. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 833.
149. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 4.1a; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 121-28 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing
some of the "real-world complications associated with collusion"); see also Nicolas de Roos,
Examining Models of Collusion: The Market for Lysine, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1083 (2006);
Dick, supra note 94; Harrington, supra note 59; Hay & Kelley, supra note 56; Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 238-40 (1986) (describing the role of the cartel "ringmaster');
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453
(2006) [hereinafter Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty]; Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels,Agency Costs and
Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621 (2008) [hereinafter Leslie,
Cartels]; Leslie, supra note 73; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking up Is
Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming Sept. 2010) ("Cartels
respond to imperfect or noisy information by trying to ...better align individual firm incentives
with those of the group" which would reduce agency costs); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52.
150. See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relational Contracts and the
Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECON. 39, 70 (2002) (concluding that "vertical integration is an
efficient response"); Mattias Ganslandt, Lars Persson & Helder Vosconcelos, Asymmetric Cartels
- A Theory of Ring Leaders 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 6829, 2008),
http://www.porto.ucp.ptfegdocentes/hvasconcelos/docs/CEPR-DP6829.pdf
at
available
(discussing "why so many cartels have a ringleader and why the leading firm is so frequently
substantially larger than other firms in a collusive market").
151. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (discussing
how "agency costs" arise when a principal cannot fully control his agents); Stewart E.
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Another consideration is the problem of detection and
prosecution. Day-to-day management of a cartel typically requires
ongoing communication among the cartel members. The more such
communication is needed, the more the cartel is likely to be detected.
Today, communications among members constitute one of the primary
types of evidence used to prove agreement in collusion cases. 152
Communications among competitors necessarily involve a certain
amount of antitrust scrutiny, even though many of them are
competitively beneficial. These facts explain why dealer cartels have
often tried to engage a manufacturer in their scheme and have it
impose behavior such as resale-price maintenance or territorial
division among them. Communications between a manufacturer and
its dealers are routine and common, and today are much less likely to
invoke antitrust scrutiny. Furthermore, cartels may prefer the
centralized model because it reduces the number of witnesses with
153
pertinent information about the details of the cartel's operations.
For all of these reasons, the cartel may function better if it does
not permit day-to-day pricing and output decisions to be made by a
vote among members, but rather delegates that function to someone
else. A corporate board or manager may be an ideal vehicle because,
as a matter of corporate function, its goal is to maximize the value of
the corporation, which it ordinarily does by maximizing profits. That
is, assuming that the profits of the corporation are a good surrogate
for the joint profits of the cartel members, maximization of the
corporation's value will occur when the cartel maximizes its profits.
This does not necessarily require that the cartel manager and the
cartel operate in precisely the same market. For example, an exclusive
joint selling agency, which is a popular cartel vehicle, might receive as
its compensation a percentage of the individual members' profits. In
that case, assuming that this formula was properly developed, the
agency would maximize its profits by maximizing the aggregate
profits of the individual members, which would coincide with the
Sterk, Trust Protectors,Agency Costs, and FiduciaryDuty, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 2761, 2763 (2006)
(discussing how a "trust protector" has "the potential to serve as a monitor of the trustee's
performance, reducing agency costs").
152. E.g., William H. Page, Communication and ConcertedAction, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405,
425 (2007) ("What is decisive in these cases is noneconomic evidence of the cause, particularly
involving communications."); William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging
Definition of ConcertedAction under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
439 (2009).
153. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 855 ("In a decentralized network, however,
there is no periphery. Many eyewitnesses to activities of numerous conspirators can be obtained,
resulting in a much higher conviction rate, as in the switchgear and transformers conspiracies.").
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cartel's profit-maximizing price. 154 In that way, corporate management
can act as a cartel facilitator in much the same way that a
manufacturer can act as a cartel facilitator in some schemes involving
vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance or territorial
division, which limit competition among dealers. 155 Importantly,
however, once such a structure is in place, daily administration of the
cartel may not require the active participation of cartel members at
all. Indeed, to the extent that their individual interests in profit
maximization differ from those of the cartel, individual participation
may serve to hinder rather than further the cartel's goals.
Most cartel structures have not been that extreme. What they
share in common, however, is the transfer of daily authority from the
cartel's members as a group to some much smaller subset, or else to a
third-party organization that has the power to control the cartel
members' individual output and prices. This Section discusses the
various ways that some cartels centralize decisionmaking. First, a
cartel might adopt a ringleader model. A ringleader is a firm that
takes the lead in decisionmaking, such as pricing and market
allocation, as well as enforcement actions by the cartel. For example,
in the lysine cartel, as the largest producers, ADM and Ajinomoto
seem to have played a greater role than their Korean counterparts in
determining price and market allocation. The ringleader-as-enforcer
model is illustrated by OPEC. For some decisions, OPEC is run
relatively democratically, but Saudi Arabia clearly plays a dominant
role. During major periods of the OPEC cartel, Saudi Arabia has
played the role of cartel enforcer, deciding which violations of the
cartel agreement to punish through punitive pricing and which
deviations to allow by cutting back its own production in order to
maintain the cartel price.1 56 Similarly, Philip Morris may have played
a ringleader role in the tobacco cartel, enforcing agreements through
price wars. 157 While enjoying more control, cartel ringleaders also put
themselves at risk of being prosecuted because their role in the
154. A commission based on sales volume or amount would not work, for that might induce
the manager to charge a competitive price or even a below-cost price.
155. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). For a discussion on
the massive retail druggists cartel that occasioned the resale price maintenance scheme in Dr.
Miles, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 136, at 184-91; HOVENKAMP, supranote 121, at 331-47.
156. James M. Griffin & Weiwen Xiong, The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of
OPEC, 40 J.L. & ECON. 289, 306 (1997) ("Historically, Saudi Arabia has played key roles in
effectuating OPEC pricing strategies.").
157. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
325-28 (2010).
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conspiracy is most clear. 158 Furthermore, although the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division grants amnesty from criminal prosecution
for the first member of a price-fixing conspiracy to expose the cartel to
the government, amnesty is not available to the instigator or
ringleader of a cartel. 159
Second, a cartel may make decisions by a committee composed
of a subset of cartel members. For example, one of the earliest cartel
cases to reach the Supreme Court 160 involved a cartel by committee. In
this cartel, which involved cast iron pipe, the cartel members assigned
territories to each other but also created a governing structure for
remaining territories "whereby all offers to purchase pipe were
submitted to a committee which set the price and awarded the
contract to the manufacturer that agreed to pay the largest bonus to
be divided among the others." 161 The cartel members relinquished
their independent power to set prices to the committee, which sought
to maximize the collective revenue of the co-conspirators.
Third, some cartels locate decisionmaking power in a single
entity, which is itself typically not a producer in the cartelized market.
A common example is a joint sales agent. Under this model, all the
members of a cartel agree to have a common sales agency make all
sales. Exclusivity is usually critical because otherwise the cartel
members would be able to avoid the cartel output limitations by
making unlimited numbers of "outside" sales, driving price back down
to the competitive level.
Exclusivity is a critical signpost for distinguishing competitive
from anticompetitive joint selling. For example, nonexclusivity has
saved joint selling ventures from antitrust liability. In Broadcast
Music, Inc., the defendant offered a blanket license for recorded music
to radio stations and other broadcasters. 162 The blanket license was
formed when thousands of individual copyright holders gave BMI
nonexclusive licenses to play their music for profit. Cartel output

158. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 66, at 855 ("[A] lower conviction rate is found in a
centralized network because only the core 'ringleaders' can be successfully prosecuted.").
159. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM pt. A6 (1993), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm; see also Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra
note 149 (advocating making ringleaders eligible for amnesty because this would destabilize
cartels by making ringleaders less trustworthy).
160. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
161. Greene v. Gen. Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 647 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing Addyston
Pipe).
162. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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reduction was highly unlikely because each individual cartel member
had the unlimited power to "cheat" on the cartel by making unlimited
numbers of noncartel sales. The Supreme Court rejected per se
condemnation, and the Second Circuit upheld the BMI blanket license
under the rule of reason. Nonexclusivity is not, however, dispositive.
In Maricopa, the Court condemned as unlawful per se a nonexclusive
agreement among physicians to market their medical services jointly
at advertised maximum prices. 163 Nevertheless, courts have frequently
cited exclusivity or its absence in determining the legality of joint
164
selling or similar horizontal arrangements.
The most significant aspect of the exclusive joint sales agent is
that it "removes individual firm discretion over pricing decisions."'165 A
common sales agent employed by a cartel sets price and other contract
terms, allocates customers, and arranges sales. 166 The cartel member
may do little more than manufacture and ship the product.
The use of an exclusive joint sales agent by cartels is relatively
common. 167 The use of a joint sales agent helped stabilize the Chilean
nitrate 168 and international nitrogenous fertilizer cartels. 169 Joint sales
agencies were also employed by the cartels in bromine, cement,

163. Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
164. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 594 (11th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to condemn a merchant interchange fee being challenged that applied only
when the merchant's bank and the card issuer's bank facilitated their transaction through Visa's
own interconnection system, called BASE II; "[s]ignificantly, the parties to the interchange are
not required to use BASE II. Merchant and issuer institutions are free to negotiate a different
rate and bypass the BASE II system entirely"); cf. Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
259 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (condemning an interchange fee found to be exclusive, and

distinguishing NaBanco). See generally 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, 2001 (discussing the
requirement of exclusivity for anticompetitive horizontal agreements); id. 2104 (discussing the
significance of joint venture exclusivity).
165. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69.
166. Dick, supra note 94, at 273 ("Cartels that were organized as common sales agencies
centralized exporting logistics by negotiating prices and terms of sale, assigning orders to
member firms, bargaining with shippers over freight and insurance rates, and collecting
remittances.").
167. Id. at 246-47 ("Four-fifths of the cartels set a common price and/or allocated markets,
and slightly more than one-half centralized export distribution through a common sales
agency."); see also 13 HOVENKAMP, supranote 22, 2132 (discussing how those participating in a
market will necessarily have to agree about many things, some of which can be regarded as
price-affecting or output-limiting, such as jointly made pricing rules and joint selling).
168. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 152-53 (1946).

169. Id. at 146-47.
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diamonds, ocean shipping, oil, potash, and European steel, among
170
others.
Perhaps the most famous example of an exclusive sales agent
was Appalachian Coals.171 In that case a group of coal producers
created an incorporated selling agency. 172 Each producer then gave
this firm the exclusive right to market its coal and to establish
standard classifications for coal. The members even gave up individual
discretion as to the price, permitting the company to sell it at the "best
prices obtainable."' 73 The consent of an individual producer on any
transaction was required only if the delivery were to occur more than
sixty days subsequent to the sale, 74 probably to ensure that the
producer would have the coal available. The Court ultimately
approved the arrangement under the rule of reason, 175 but it never
doubted conspiratorial capacity notwithstanding that the individual
producers had entirely taken themselves out of the conduct of daily
business.
Cartels pursue the joint exclusive sales agent model for a
number of reasons. First, vesting power within a single sales agent
eliminates many of the coordination impasses that may otherwise
occur. For example, the sales agent sets the price. There is no need to
orchestrate price announcements. The price is uniform and moves
simultaneously for all cartel participants through the sales agent's
decisions.
Second, making all sales through an exclusive sales agent
reduces the risk of cartel-destabilizing cheating. Firms in a cartel
cannot sell more than their allotment if all sales are made through the
central office and cannot offer a lower price if the price is set by the
common agent. 76 The exclusive sales agent model solves the problem
of distrust that can destabilize cartels because firms do not have to
trust their cartel partners. 77 Professors Margaret Levenstein and
170. See Leslie, supra note 73, at 621 (discussing other examples of cartels employing a joint
sales agency); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 825-26 (noting cartel's use of a
combination of joint sales agency and joint venture).
171. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
172. On the relevance of the status of Appalachian Coals as a corporation independent of its
coal producer constituents, see Copperweld Corp. v.Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763
& n.7 (1984).
173. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 357-58.
174. Id. at 358.
175. See id. at 360.
176. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69 (noting that the joint sales agency
"eliminates the possibility that individual firms will engage in secret cheating).
177. Leslie, supra note 73, at 621, 634.
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Valerie Suslow conclude that the joint sales agency is "the strongest
organizational form used to 'monitor' output."178 In American Needle,
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that cartels employ a single
management structure in order to reduce the risk of cheating: "Indeed,
a joint venture with a single management structure is generally a
better way to operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a party
179
to an illegal agreement defecting from that agreement."
Significantly, the arrangement in American Needle was also exclusive.
Each team assigned to NFLP the exclusive right to market its
intellectual property. 180
Third, and most importantly, joint sales agencies strongly
correlate with cartel success. 8 1 In his study of export cartels organized
under the Webb-Pomerene Act, Andrew Dick found that price-fixing
cartels that employed "common sales agencies tended to restrict
exports and raise price."' 8 2 Further, "cartels that organized as common
sales agencies were longer-lived on average."'8 3 For example, one of
the most successful known examples is the international iodine cartel,
which used a joint sales agent to conduct all sales to run a cartel for
over sixty years.'8 4 In short, the net effect of the joint sales agency is
to stabilize a cartel.185
The utility of common sales agents to further cartel interests is
not lost on antitrust enforcers. Because the agreement among
competitors to utilize a joint sales agent can stabilize a cartel,
antitrust law generally prohibits such agreements as an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
Some cartels present hybrids of these various mechanisms. For
example, the diamond cartel used a joint sales agency-the Central
Selling Office ("CSO")-in London to run the cartel, but DeBeers was

178. Levenstein & Suslow, supranote 52, at 69.
179. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010).
180. Id. at 2207 (noting that prior to 2000 the licenses had been nonexclusive, but in
December of 2000 the teams authorized NFLP to grant exclusive licenses).
181. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 69 (cartels that used joint sales agencies "were
among the more successful cartels").
182. Dick, supranote 94, at 256.
183. Id. at 275.
184. Robert S. Pindyck, The Cartelizationof World Commodity Markets, 69 AM. EcON. REV.
154, 157 (1979).
185. Dick, supra note 94, at 241 ("Contracts in which the cartel centralized its control
through a common sales agency tended to be more stable.'); Levenstein & Suslow, supranote 52,
at 69 ("Cartels that control the distribution of goods, through a joint sales agency or some other
mechanism, appear to be more stable.').
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also clearly the ringleader of the cartel.18 6 In addition to the CSO, the
diamond cartel set up a network of dealer clubs comprised of sight
holders, manufacturers, wholesalers, and brokers.1 8 7 The subdivisions
of the diamond cartel developed their own internal private arbitration
mechanisms.18 8 The diamond cartel's contracts with its members
contained price-fixing clauses and quotas. 189 So, it was not a pure joint
sales agent structure, but it contained this element. Cartels can
fashion their own corporate structures to implement and police a
price-fixing conspiracy, but Levenstein and Suslow argue "that the
more elaborate these sharing and monitoring mechanisms-or the
closer they bring the cartel to a joint sales agency-the more stable
the cartel."'190
III. CARTEL STRUCTURE AND THE SINGLE ENTITY QUESTION
If the primary purpose of Section One is to deter and punish
price-fixing cartels, then the single entity question should be
considered in light of how cartels operate. This will assist courts in
applying the Copperweld doctrine in light of American Needle. In other
words, why do a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
constitute a single entity for antitrust purposes and the teams within
the NFL do not? Studying cartel structure helps answer this question.
Part III synthesizes the historical lessons of how cartels operate with
the antitrust-agreement analysis of the American Needle decision.

186. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 53 (1994) ("It is generally understood,
however, that DeBeers insists on being both the sole purchaser and the price setter and that the
CSO is the sole distributor."); see also Bill Keller, DeBeers May Be Losing Grip on Diamond
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1992, at Al.

187. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119 (1992). One mid-century report explained part of
the corporate structure of the diamond cartel as follows:
The diamond industry's marketing system, and DeBeers' dominant position in it,
became fully established in the early 1930's with the creation of three new corporate
entities-the Diamond Trading Corporation, Ltd., the Diamond Producers
Association, Ltd., and the Diamond Trading Company, Ltd.-all controlled by
DeBeers. The Diamond Corporation holds exclusive contracts for the purchase of the
alluvial diamond production of Western and Central Africa. The Diamond Producers
Association functions as the sole purchaser of South African diamonds. Both the
Diamond Corporation and Diamond Producers Association sell their diamonds
exclusively to the Diamond Trading Company, which is thus the single distributing
agency for ninety-seven percent of the African diamond production.
Note, The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALE L.J. 1404, 1407 (1947).
188. Bernstein, supra note 187, at 121.
189. Note, supra note 187, at 1408-09.
190. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 52, at 71.
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A. Touchstones for DeterminingSingle Entity Status
Reading Copperweld and American Needle in combination
leads to several principles on how to distinguish a single entity from a
collection of actors who are capable of conspiring.
1. Substance over Form
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court established that "substance,
not form, should determine whether a[n] ... entity is capable of
conspiring under § 1."191 The Court held that in form a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary are legally distinct entities, but in substance,
for antitrust purposes, they represent one entity because their unified
action does not "deprive[ ] the marketplace of independent centers of
192
decisionmaking."
The Court in American Needle again emphasized that it rejects
"formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how
the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually
operate." 193 This time, however, the Court analyzed the issue from a
different perspective. While in Copperweld, the Court held that the
presence of two legal entities did not necessarily constitute concerted
action, in American Needle, the Court held that the deposit of
decisionmaking power in "a legally 'single entity'" did not necessarily
prove the absence of concerted action. 194 Legal descriptions are not
determinative; instead, to determine whether an alleged combination
constitutes concerted action, the key is "whether it joins together
195
separate decisionmakers."
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court noted
that in form, the teams might appear to be a single entity-as the
Seventh Circuit had held-because they "organized and own a legally
separate entity that centralizes the management of their intellectual
property." 196 In substance, however, the teams were separate and
capable of conspiring because "[e]ach of the teams is a substantial,
independently owned, and independently managed business." 197 More

191. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 n.21 (1984).
192. Id. at 769.
193. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010).
194. Id. at 2210 ("We have similarly looked past the form of a legally 'single entity' when
competitors were part of professional organizations or trade groups.").
195. Id. at 2212.
196. Id. at 2213.
197. Id. at 2212.
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importantly, the teams were in competition with each other for "fans,
for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing
19 8
personnel."
The emphasis of substance over form is critical when analyzing
cartels. When cartels employ a centralized decisionmaking vehiclewhether a trade association, a joint sales agent, or an incorporated
management structure-it may appear that a single entity is in
control or that all the relevant agreements are vertical rather than
horizontal. For example, one could argue that firms employing a joint
sales agent are not agreeing on price, because they do not discuss
price at all; all price decisions are made by a single entity, the agent.
But this argument is too simple. The ringleader model of centralized
decisionmaking-in which competitors agree to allow one seller to
serve as ringleader-is clearly an agreement (and an illegal one at
that). From an antitrust standpoint, there is no difference between
agreeing to abide by the ringleader's decisions and agreeing to cede
decisionmaking authority to a separate entity that runs the cartel.
Either way, an independent firm has agreed to not compete on price.
For example, when DeBeers acts as a ringleader, there is clearly a
cartel. When DeBeers sets up the Central Selling Office with a
different name to run the cartel, it has the same anticompetitive effect
and is not meaningfully distinguishable. Either way, there is an
agreement. The more important question is not who controls, but
rather how is the business of independent firms controlled by the
central organization; that is, do the organization's operations have an
impact on the price and output decisions of otherwise independent
decisionmakers?
It is also important not to be sidetracked by the distinction
between horizontal and vertical agreements. While horizontal
agreements are treated with considerable hostility by the antitrust
laws, vertical agreements are nearly always addressed under the rule
of reason and most are legal. This includes resale price maintenance,
nonprice restraints, exclusive dealing, and vertical boycotts. 199 When
each firm in a group gives a sales agent an exclusive right to sell their
produce, the form of the arrangement looks like a series of vertical
agreements. Of course, there may have been a horizontal agreement to
use an exclusive sale agency, but there may not have been an express
agreement, or that agreement may be sufficiently surreptitious that it
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (purely vertical boycott to be
governed under rule of reason).
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cannot be proven. And indeed, not every exclusive sales agency
agreement is a cartel. For example, an artist who hangs her painting
in a consignment gallery may be giving the gallery an exclusive right
to sell her painting for the consignment period. If twenty different
artists do the same thing they are certainly agreeing individually with
the gallery, but they are not agreeing with each other and may not
even be aware of one another's existence.
Price-fixing firms may go to great lengths to make their
schemes appear to be the product of a single entity's decisionmaking
or of purely vertical agreements. For example, in some historical
cases, the member firms structured their cartels so that "the common
sales agency actually took title to the product, as would a merchant
wholesaler." 200 In that case the form of the agreement would be a set
of sales from each cartel member individually to the facilitator, as in a
supplier-dealer relationship. Each of the agreements considered
individually would be vertical.
It would be foolish for antitrust law to hold that competitors'
use of a joint sales agent--or any other single entity-renders them
immune from Section One scrutiny. Section One is primarily geared at
prohibiting, deterring, and punishing price-fixing cartels. Although
cartels are inherently unstable, they can be stabilized through the use
of a joint sales agent. That is, being misled by the single entity or
purely vertical characterization would effectively remove from
antitrust review a class of cartel arrangements that are in fact among
the most stable, and thus the most harmful to consumers. As the
Seventh Circuit explained in one cartel case, "almost any market can
be cartelized if the law permits sellers to establish formal, overt
mechanisms for colluding, such as exclusive sales agencies." 20 1 In
short, agreeing to create an exclusionary structure-whether a joint
sales agent or ringleader-is an agreement that is subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
2. The Necessity of Coordination
In concluding that the NFL and its teams were a single entity,
the Seventh Circuit in its American Needle opinion focused on the
presence of "common interests." For example, the court emphasized
that "the NFL teams share a vital economic interest in collectively

200. CONNOR, supra note 125, at 27.
201. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002).

852

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3:813

promoting NFL football. ' 20 2 The Seventh Circuit then stressed the
necessity of cooperation in sports leagues, noting that that "the
product that the teams produce jointly-NFL football-requires
20 3
extensive coordination and integration between the teams."
This presents two related issues-that the actors have common
interests and that coordination is necessary for them to achieve these
common interests. The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning on both. First, the Court held that the presence of common
interests does not convert a joint effort into a single entity because the
NFL teams "are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their
20 4
interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned."
Second, the American Needle Court held that simply because
coordination among team owners is necessary to provide the product,
that does not mean that necessity of cooperation transforms concerted action into
independent action; a nut and a bolt can only operate together, but an agreement
between nut and bolt manufacturers is still subject to § 1 analysis. Nor does it mean
that once a group of firms agree to produce a joint product, cooperation amongst those
firms must be treated as independent conduct. The mere fact that the teams operate
205
jointly in some sense does not mean that they are immune.

Ultimately, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the reason why the
firms are cooperating does not help answer the question whether the
20 6
firms are capable of conspiring.
The Court's holdings are appropriate given the economics of
cartelization. The presence of common interests cannot be a basis for
finding a collaboration to be a single entity since rival firms form
cartels because it is in their common interest to reduce output and
increase price. But it is these effects that warrant condemnation of
cartels. Moreover, all illegal agreements are likely to be in the
common interests of the conspirators; otherwise they would not
agree. 207 Furthermore, the need for cooperation cannot be dispositive.
202. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010);
see also Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1397 (8th Cir. 1993) (jury instruction
stated: " 'here the entities possess an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose, they are
not separate entities capable of conspiring").
203. 538 F.3d at 737, rev'd, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).
204. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp,

Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 52-61; Zenichi
Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 69-81 (1987)).
205. Id. at 2214.
206. Id. ('The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is
concerted or independent action.").
207. Id. at 2213 ('But illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to
the restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.").
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As explained in Part II, price-fixing schemes require an enormous
amount of cooperation and coordination to create and maintain a
stable cartel. Antitrust law should disrupt these coordination efforts,
not reward them through Copperweld immunity.
The necessity of cooperation is, nevertheless, important for
Section One analysis. If restraints on competition are necessary to
produce the product at issue, then the agreement will be evaluated
under the rule of reason, instead of condemned under the per se
rule. 20 8 This, however, provides no breathing room for naked price
fixing, which is per se illegal. However, the presence of common
interests and the need for coordination cannot convert separate actors
into a single entity for antitrust purposes.
3. The Nature and Direction of Control
The decisions in Copperweld and American Needle also indicate
that the nature and direction of control matters. Where does control
reside? Who exercises control over whom? Most importantly, are
persons with separate ownership or business interests placed under
control? For example, Copperweld held that the parent corporation
completely controlled its wholly owned subsidiary, which had no
separate business. Similarly, sibling corporations that are each wholly
owned subsidiaries of the same parent fall within Copperweld, and
their agreements are generally immune from Section One liability. In
Dagher the Supreme Court refused to find Section One liability over a
joint venture that had taken on all of the production, refining, and
marketing activities of its two parent firms. 20 9 In that case the issue
was not whether the joint venture was in "control." Clearly it was.
Rather, the important fact was that, as in Copperweld, no independent
interests remained to be controlled, since all of the parents' separate
business activities had terminated and been merged into the
venture. 210 The Dagher Court distinguished a rule of reason
application of Section One of the Sherman Act under the ancillary
restraints doctrine. That doctrine, it pointed out, "governs the validity
of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such ' 2as
11
a business association or joint venture, on nonventure activities."

208.
(1984)).
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 2215 n.6 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
See infra notes 262-269 and accompanying text.
Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7.
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That is to say, Section One would be invoked to the extent that the
central organization sought to limit the participants' activities outside
the venture, but it did not apply when there were no such outside
activities to limit.
In thinking of cartel control, it is important to distinguish
cartel formation from cartel operation. Cartels are voluntary
organizations. By and large firms are not forced to join.2 12 At the time
a cartel is formed the individual members are clearly in control.
Further, as a group they want the same thing: maximization of joint
profits. Once the cartel is formed, however, incentives change. At that
point each cartel member can profit by cheating, provided that the
rest of the cartel hangs together. As a result, control flows in both
directions. At the time of formation the members are in control in the
sense that they voluntarily join and set up the cartel's structure. Once
ongoing operations begin, however, cartel success depends on the
ability of the cartel's administration to control the members' day-today output and pricing behavior.
American Needle is fairly typical. The individual teams
participated in creating NFLP and assigned it their IP rights.
Thereafter NFLP managed those rights, limiting the individual teams'
ability to sell their IP rights separately. The fact that a single
incorporated entity such as NFLP served a coordinating function did
not make it a single entity for antitrust purposes. NFLP did not
govern the teams the way that a parent corporation governs its wholly
owned subsidiaries. Instead, the "teams remain separately controlled,
potential competitors with economic interests that are distinct from
NFLP's financial well-being." 2 13 In its briefs the NFL argued
vehemently that the individual teams had little to no control over
their own IP rights. Indeed, for the most part they did not even
212. Occasionally concerted refusals to deal and similar tactics are used to coerce firms into
joining a cartel, but these are themselves actionable under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Rossi v.
Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 1998) (members of roofing cartel conspired to
deny price cutter access to materials); Denny's Marina v. Renfro Prods., 8 F.3d 1217, 1219-20
(7th Cir. 1993) (defendant boat sellers conspired to deny price cutting seller access to annual
boat show). This was also a fair reading of the claim in HartfordFire Insurance Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 770-78 (1993), namely, that the defendant insurers were involved in a cartel to
limit coverage and conspired with the Insurance Services Office to deny loss data and with
Lloyds and others to deny reinsurance to insurers who were unwilling to join the cartel. See
generally 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 22,
2201 (discussing several cases in which concerted
refusal to deal with respect to one transaction in order to get the target to change its behavior
with respect to another and unrelated transaction was subject to legal action under antitrust
laws).
213. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp,
Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52-61).
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develop them. Rather, the league itself assigned the teams its official
colors and "takes the lead in developing and registering the marks of
any new member club. '214 No team could change its name, marks, or
logo without NFLP's consent. 215 But the Court's decision turned on the
way that the League controlled business activities that the individual
member teams could otherwise have engaged in separately.
When one entity absolutely controls all aspects of the business
of multiple other entities owned by the parent, as in Copperweld, there
is one entity for antitrust purposes. When a single entity is set up by
the participants in order to control their actual or potentially separate
business interests, as in American Needle, then there are multiple
entities capable of conspiring for antitrust purposes. This is true
whether that dependent entity is a joint venture, a trade association,
or a joint sales agent, and also whether or not the controlling entity is
a corporation, as NFLP was. Suppose two separate firms create a joint
venture and each owns half. Depending on how it is structured and
presented, a joint venture may appear to be single entity with its own
name, logo, product, etc. However, for antitrust purposes, the joint
venture is a product of concerted action, and actions by the venture
management that limit the separate business of each firm are
conspiratorial to the extent they limit competition that could
otherwise have occurred. Control can certainly be an indicator of
conspiratorial capacity. In American Needle, the Supreme Court cited
Sealy and several other decisions as involving situations where "the
entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence,
as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity."216 The Supreme Court paid
scant attention to questions about how decisionmaking within the
NFL is made or the extent to which the individual teams participated
in the decision to grant Reebok an exclusive license. Rather, the fact
was that the exclusive licensing decision limited the abilities of the
217
individual teams to market their IP rights separately.
214. Brief for the NFL Respondents at *7,Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010)
(No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3865438.
215. Id.
216. Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2209 (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)).
On Sealy, see infra the discussion accompanying notes 222-42. See also Nw. Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596
(1972); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 26 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
217. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 ("The NFL respondents may be similar in some sense to
a single enterprise that owns several pieces of intellectual property and licenses them jointly, but
they are not similar in the relevant functional sense. Although NFL teams have common
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4. Ability to Withdraw
The Supreme Court cases also suggest that another metric for
determining single entity status is looking at withdrawal status. In
other words, can the members of a centralized body withdraw from the
structure? If not, it is more likely to be a single entity. If the members
can withdraw, however, then that suggests that they are independent
decisionmakers capable of conspiring. The Court in American Needle
noted, after explaining the collective intellectual property licensing
arrangement through NFLP, that the individual NFL teams "are able
' 2 18
to and have at times sought to withdraw from this arrangement."
The Copperweld opinion shows that a parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary constitute a single entity for antitrust
purposes because the subsidiary is not independent since it cannot, on
its own accord, exit the relationship. In contrast, the independence of
the teams of a sports league is illustrated in part by their ability to
unilaterally withdraw from the enterprise.
A cartel may create a joint sales agency apparently vested with
the power to set and impose its will on member firms, who may claim
that they are controlled by the central body, not independent
decisionmakers, and therefore entitled to Copperweld immunity. This
argument is weakened by the fact that members can withdraw from
the cartel arrangement. All individual firms have the ability to depart
the cartel and to compete on the merits. This power to withdraw is
what each firm threatens to exercise during the cartel creation and
renegotiation process in order to maximize its take of the cartel's
profits.
The presence of a centralized cartel enforcer does not affect the
single entity analysis. Even when the agreement creates a single
decisionmaker, this entity's creation is the result of the collective
decision of separate decisionmakers. The resulting body does not
possess true control; rather the constituent parts have ceded
temporary control for limited purposes. We know that the control is
not real because each cartel member can withdraw from an
arrangement and regain the control that it temporarily relinquished
to the cartel. Furthermore, the fact that the cartel members do not
directly fix the actual price is beside the point; they agreed to create
the structure that controls the price. Each firm could reassert control

interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities,
and their interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.").
218. Id. at 2207.
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over price by exiting the arrangement. Although it might seem that
any
the firm may be contractually bound to the joint sales agency,
219
One.
Section
violates
it
because
void
be
such contract would
5. Relevance of Corporate Form
As the Supreme Court has made clear, corporate form is not
decisive of the conspiratorial capacity issue. 220 It may, however, still
be relevant. Copperweld found a single entity notwithstanding that
the challenged "agreement" was between two separate corporations.
American Needle found conspiratorial capacity even though the
licensor was a single corporation. Corporate control is relevant, but
the identity of the entities that a corporation controls is also relevant.
For example, if a group of rivals organizes a corporation and then
manages it so as to limit their independent business interests,
conspiratorial capacity is present. The Supreme Court assumed this in
Appalachian Coals and explicitly recognized it in Sealy and Topco.
But consider a different structure. A group of independent
mattress manufacturers, wishing to produce under a common name,
sponsor the launch of an IPO. The resulting company is owned ninety
percent by a typical miscellany of investors and ten percent by the
manufacturers. The manufacturers do not get a member on the board
of directors and have no say in the daily operations of the firm.
However, the firm has the power to control the individual business
decisions pertaining to sales location, production, and pricing. The
directors, as any board, are charged with maximizing the value of the
business. They do this by imposing restrictions that limit the output of
the individual manufacturers or force them to charge a particular
price.
In this case, the firms have organized themselves as a managed
cartel. The fact that they have no formal "control" in the day-to-day
operations of the corporation and do not even have a presence on the
board of directors is no more relevant than the Copperweld facts that
the parent and subsidiary were separately incorporated. Just as the
219. See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1969) (holding that
agreement between the only two newspapers in the county to jointly set their subscription and
advertising rates, pool their profits, and refrain from engaging in business that competed with
the newspapers was illegal for violating Section One); Spitzer v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp.
2d 399, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that agreement between hospitals to fix rates, terms and
conditions for services and allocating markets violated Section One); Leslie, supra note 73, at
645-46 (discussing how those wishing to withdraw from price-fixing conspiracies should confess
so as to avoid antitrust liability still attached to the agreement).
220. See supranotes 191-201 and accompanying text.
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Appalachian Coals corporation was formed for the purpose of selling
coal at the best price it could obtain, the directors of our hypothetical
corporation are required to maximize their corporation's value, which
corporate law obligates them to do. Clearly, decisions about the price
and output of plants owned and operated by the corporation itself are
unilateral. However, if the corporation acts by imposing restrictions on
the separately owned business of the individual manufacturers, the
conduct is no longer unilateral. The issue has nothing to do with
formal or even informal control of the corporation, but with the fact
that the corporation is controlling the separate businesses of these
shareholders.
The situation somewhat resembles a manufacturer's control of
the business of its independent dealers. For example, a firm such as
General Motors ("GM") has franchise relationships with numerous
dealers. Many of these dealers may be GM shareholders, and it is
conceivable that in GM, or some other franchise, certain individual
franchisees or franchisee groups are major or even controlling
shareholders. None of these ownership facts changes GM from a single
firm to a cartel. However, as soon as GM imposes restrictions on a
franchised dealer's separate business, by restricting its location or
setting its resale prices, imposing exclusivity or exclusive dealing
clauses, or either tying goods sold to the dealer or requiring the dealer
to tie in its own sales, the conduct is multilateral and reachable under
Section One. Whether or not that particular dealer owns any GM
shares is irrelevant. Nor is it relevant whether the dealer whose
business is subject to this limitation is in any way in control. The only
relevant question is whether GM is controlling the dealer's separate
business.
Antitrust law characterizes these restraints as vertical and for
the most part subjects them to lenient treatment. However, it
uniformly characterizes the conduct as collaborative rather than
unilateral, even if the relationship between firms, such as franchisor
and franchisee, is so complete that the franchisees are effectively
operating as a subsidiary. The Supreme Court has recognized
exceptions for certain situations where a cartel of dealers "controls"
the parent firm's conduct, but we would not be speaking of corporate
control through shareholder voting or director or manager dominance.
Rather, we would be speaking of contractual control. 22 1 Beyond that,
221. Under the Supreme Court's Leegin decision, which adopted a rule of reason for resale
price maintenance, a horizontal agreement among dealers in a single brand to fix prices could be
treated under the per se rule, while a vertical agreement between a supplier and its dealers
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the agreements would be treated under the rule of reason as
multilateral activity, just the way the Supreme Court treated the
222
restraint in that case.
B. Case Studies
Cartels have several options for how to structure their
decisionmaking processes. The fact that some cartels choose a
centralized cartel model does not convert a cartel into a single entity.
A joint venture, cooperative, trade association, or joint sales agent
might appear to be a single entity, but it is not for antitrust purposes
when it is the instrument of independent actors. Understanding how
cartels operate helps apply American Needle in a fashion that protects
actual single entities from inappropriate antitrust liability while
ensuring that concerted action does not escape scrutiny.
In order to show how the factors described above can help
courts distinguish between concerted action and conduct by a single
entity, this Section applies the factors to joint ventures, past and
present, that raise antitrust concerns. Even if antitrust defendants in
these cases do not seem to represent a classic price-fixing cartel,
antitrust law should not be interpreted to render them a "single
entity" for antitrust purposes because this could have implications for
later cases involving an actual cartel.
1. Sealy and Topco
The American Needle opinion quoted and cited liberally from
two prior Supreme Court cases, Copperweld and Sealy. The
invocations of Copperweld are hardly surprising given that American
Needle was essentially a case about the application and limits of
Copperweld immunity. In contrast, the reliance on Sealy was less

facilitating such a cartel would be treated under the rule of reason. Both, however, would be
treated as collaborative activity. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 893 (2007) ("A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that
decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per
To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered
se unlawful ....
upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of
reason.") (citations omitted); see also Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530
F.3d 204, 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (relying on this passage to deny summary judgment on
complaint that a truck manufacturer maintained resale prices at the behest of a cartel of its
dealers).
222. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (finding conspiratorial capacity and remanding for
consideration of the restraint under the rule of reason).
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expected. In Sealy, the government challenged Sealy's policy of
granting exclusive territories to its licensees who manufactured Sealybrand mattresses. 223 The government argued that, because the
licensees controlled the Sealy Board of Directors, the arrangement
constituted horizontal market division, which is per se illegal. 224 Sealy
argued that it was in a vertical relationship with its licensees and that
225
its policy should be evaluated under the more lenient rule of reason.
226
The Court sided with the government.
On its face, the Sealy opinion seems unrelated to the single
entity question. 227 Indeed, the Copperweld opinion never mentions
Sealy. Yet the American Needle Court found Sealy instructive.
Because Sealy predated Copperweld, it was decided at a time when
antitrust law permitted findings of conspiracy between a parent and a
subsidiary, at least for some purposes. 228 So the single entity question
was not explicitly litigated in Sealy. Indeed, instead of arguing that
Sealy and its licensees constituted a single entity, Sealy argued that
"the evidence shows that Sealy has been operated as a separate entity,
22 9
in its own interest, and not in the private interests of its licensees
and that "evidence showing the scrupulously maintained separation
between Sealy's corporate interests and the individual interests of its
licensees precludes the conclusion that Sealy and its licensees are not
separate entities." 230 The closest that Sealy came to making a single
entity argument was its suggestion that Sealy's arrangement should
get the same deference as Simmons, an integrated firm not subject to
231
Section One scrutiny because it was a single entity.

223. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence,93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008) (questioning the value of the Sealy horizontal versus

vertical debate).
227. The primary holdings of Sealy are that horizontal territorial allocation schemes are per
se illegal and that apparently vertical restraints may, in reality, be horizontal restraints when
horizontal actors control the vertical relationship.
228. On such findings prior to Copperweld, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20,
1463 (discussing Supreme Court intraenterprise cases from Yellow Cab to Copperweld).
229. Brief for Appellee, Sealy, Inc. at 6, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No.
9), 1966 WL 100609 [hereinafter Sealy Respondent Brief]; see also id. at 21 ("Sealy's separate
existence as a profitable enterprise operated for its overall best interests, and not as a mere
instrumentality or creature of its licensees.").
230. Id. at 31.
231. Richard W. McLaren, Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, United States v. Sealy, 388
U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9) [hereinafter Sealy Transcript] (arguing that Simmons is "an integrated
firm; and that's one of the points we argue: Why should a licensee manufacturer under a
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The fact that the Supreme Court treated the Sealy
organizational structure as concerted action is not controversial. Still,
the underlying facts can inform how lower courts should apply
American Needle and Copperweld moving forward. First, the Sealy
Court emphasized substance over form with respect to how to classify
the restraint at issue. 232 But the Court also touched on the importance
of elevating substance over form and the antitrust implications of the
structure of joint ventures when it characterized "the use of Sealy, not
as a separate entity, but as an instrumentality of the individual
233
manufacturers."
In substance, the Sealy structure was the result of agreements
among independent actors. The Court noted that "Sealy agreed with
each licensee not to license any other person to manufacture or sell in
the designated area; and the licensee agreed not to manufacture or
sell 'Sealy products' outside the designated area. ' 23 4 Sales outside of
one's assigned territory were "expressly forbidden by the contract
between Sealy and the licensee." 235 In seeking to avoid the per se rule,
the Sealy defendants noted their "contractual arrangement" should
not be judged more harshly than "structural arrangements," like
mergers or joint ventures. 236 In making this argument, the defendants
hit on an important point: they noted that they were in a contractual
relationship. This suggests no single entity, because a single entity
does not contract with itself. For example, a parent corporation and a
wholly owned subsidiary do not make contracts with each other to
carry out their plans. The parent tells the subsidiary what to do. The
executives and other employees directly responsible for the
subsidiary's day-to-day operations may make suggestions and provide
input, but they have no power to pursue divergent policies in conflict

trademark have to go out and compete with other people under that trademark when a brand
owner, he doesn't?"); id. ("And that's a basic issue in this case: Does a licensee trademark
manufacturer have the same sort of rights as a trademark owner, or is he some sort of secondclass citizen where he has to compete against other people manufacturing under the same
brand?").
232. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. at 352 ("If we look at substance rather than form, there is little
room for debate. These must be classified as horizontal restraints.").
233. Id. at 356.
234. Id. at 352.
235. Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9),
1966 WL 100610 [hereinafter Sealy Petitioner Brief].
236. United States v. Sealy, Inc., Motion to Affirm at 29, available at 21 ANTITRUST LAW:
MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

1955

Term - 1975 Term, at 815 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1979) (emphasis in
original).
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with parent's orders. In sum, if parties are contracting with each
other, then they are separate entities capable of conspiring.
It is appropriate that Sealy and its licensees were treated as
independent entities because, in reality, Sealy employed the structure
of a price-fixing cartel. With the competitor-licensees comprising the
board of directors, Sealy established minimum prices, below which
Sealy manufacturer-licensees could not charge. Following a trial, the
district court found that the Sealy manufacturer-licensees had
engaged in an illegal conspiracy to fix minimum retail prices on Sealy
products and to police the prices so fixed. 237 Sealy did not appeal the
238

finding.
With respect to its territorial exclusivity policies, Sealy
operated as a traditional cartel in some ways. For example, there were
"numerous instances" in which licensees complained about price
cutting by other licensees. 239 Sealy enforced its territorial exclusivity
scheme by requiring manufacturers to pay ten dollars for each Sealy
item sold in another licensee's territory.240 The payments were made
to Sealy, who forwarded them to the aggrieved licensee. 24 1 This is
reminiscent of the buyback policies employed by illegal price-fixing
cartels. 242 Beyond these classic cartel-enforcement devices, in
mediating disputes among quarreling licensees, Sealy had no real
authority beyond the power of persuasion. 243 This stands in stark
contrast to a true single entity structure where the central body
controls the constituent parts. For example, a parent corporation does
not fine its subsidiary or try to persuade it to take a particular action.
The parent controls the subsidiary outright.
Sealy argued that everyone involved in the Sealy structure
shared the common interest of building the Sealy brand. 244 It asserted
that its licensees had to cooperate by focusing on their own territories
and not freeriding on the investments in advertising made by other
237. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. at 351.
238. Id.; see also id. at 355-56 (1967) ("Appellee has not appealed the order of the District
Court enjoining continuation of this price-fixing, but the existence and impact of the practice

cannot be ignored in our appraisal of the territorial limitations. In the first place, this flagrant
and pervasive price-fixing, in obvious violation of the law, was, as the trial court found, the
activity of the 'stockholder representatives' acting through and in collaboration with Sealy
mechanisms.").
239. See Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 49.

240. Sealy Petitioner Brief, supra note 235, at 5.
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.

243. Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 7 (citing specific instances).
244. Sealy Respondent Brief, supra note 229, at 21.
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Sealy licensees in their respective territories. 245 Finally, Sealy argued
that it had to coordinate these efforts from the center and impose
them on the licensees. 246 The Court found that none of rationales
justified the agreements among Sealy and its licensees. 247 By
implication, Sealy's coordination arguments present no reason to
suggest that Sealy and its licensees should constitute a single entity
for antitrust purposes.
A finding of conspiratorial capacity was obvious in Sealy
because the individual bedding manufacturers were its only
stockholders and completely controlled the corporation itself. About
the best argument that the manufacturers could muster was that they
wore two "hats," one when they acted in their own individual interests
and another when they were acting on behalf of Sealy, Inc. 248 The
Court had little difficulty concluding that, even though Sealy assigned
the exclusive territories at issue, these should be construed as the
product of a horizontal agreement among Sealy's manufacturer
directors. The government argued that "the source of the territorial
restriction is not an independent third party but the very sellers
whom the restriction is designed to shield from competition."' 249 When
control flows from the members to a central agent, concerted action is
involved.
Finally, the licensees' power to withdraw shows the presence of
concerted action. The Sealy licensees could abandon their Sealy
trademarks and manufacture mattresses under another label. They
made long-term decisions about what was best for them, not
necessarily what was best for Sealy. 250 This is similar to firms in a
cartel, which continually decide whether remaining in the cartel is in
25 1
their own best interest.
All of the defendants in Sealy manufactured and sold products
under a common trademark. Yet they were capable of conspiring. In
some ways, this presents a stronger case for single entity status than
245. Id. at 21-22.
246. Id.
247. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
248. Id. at 353.
249. Sealy Petitioner Brief, supra note 235, at 22; id. at 24 ("Sealy... is not an independent
firm responsive to interests other than those of its licensees. It is completely dominated by the
licensees.").
250. See Daniel Friedman, Sealy Transcript, supra note 231, at 4 ("[Licensees are]
independent in the sense that they're not controlled by Sealy. And they're also independent in
the sense that each one makes its own judgments as to how best exploit his particular market.")
251. See Leslie, Cartels, supra note 149, at 1638 ("Each firm makes an independent decision
as to whether joining or remaining in a cartel is in the firm's own best interest.").
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the NFL teams in American Needle, each of which possessed its own
trademarks. It would be odd to say that firms sharing a single
trademark were capable of conspiring while firms aggregating
disparate trademarks were not. In terms of organizational structure,
NFLP in American Needle operated as a centralized administrator in
the same manner that Sealy did with its licensees and as the Central
Selling Office did for the diamond cartel. In all of these situations, the
presence of a central decisionmaking body does not render the overall
enterprise a single entity for antitrust purposes.
In addition to discussing Sealy, the American Needle Court
opinion also cited United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.252 In Topco,
several small- or medium-sized regional supermarket chains created
and marketed the Topco brand canned goods. 253 The Topco cooperative
allocated exclusive territories to its members. 25 4 The government
challenged the association's exclusive territory policy as a per se
illegal horizontal division of markets. 255 The Court sided with the
government, rejecting Topco's claim that the policy was a reasonable
way to prevent freeriding and to build the Topco brand as a competitor
to national store brands. 25 6 American Needle cited Topco, along with
Sealy, for the proposition that "[a]greements made within a firm can
constitute concerted action covered by § 1 when the parties to the
agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself, and
the intrafirm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing
concerted action."257 It also highlighted Topco as an example of a
"formally distinct business organization[ ] covered by § 1."258 As in
Sealy, Topco's members owned all of its stock and controlled the board
259
of directors.
Both the Topco and Sealy decisions have been rightfully
criticized for applying an overly aggressive per se rule to restraints
that were ancillary to legitimate, efficiency-enhancing joint ventures
by firms that lacked significant market power. 260 But that is not why

252. 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
253. Id. at 596.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 612.
257. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010).
258. Id. at 2210.
259. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. at 598.
1910c2 (criticizing the Topco
260. See 11 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 22,
2033b
Court's application of a per se rule against horizontal territorial restraints); 12 id.
(criticizing the Court's classification of the restraints in Sealy and Topco as "vertical'); 13 id.
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American Needle cited them. Both decisions also held that when a
corporation imposes market limitations on the separate business of its
shareholders who are in a position to compete with one another, the
resulting restraints should be considered as a contract or combination
rather than a unilateral act insofar as antitrust policy is concerned.
The proper analysis in both cases would have been to apply Section
One, but then to analyze the restraints at issue as ancillary to the
activities of a joint venture. Both the Seventh and D.C. Circuits have
taken this approach, and nothing in the American Needle opinion
26 1
suggests that the Supreme Court would treat them any differently.
2. Dagher
In Texaco v. Dagher,262 a private plaintiff challenged an
agreement between Texaco and Shell Oil that created Equilon
Enterprises, a joint venture to refine and sell gasoline in the western
United States. The joint venture set a single price for gasoline, which
continued to be sold under the Texaco and Shell Oil brands. The Court
granted certiorari to determine whether this constituted per se illegal
price fixing.
While the case was limited to the reach of the per se rule, at
times the opinion seemed to implicate the single entity question. For
example, the Court framed the question as if Copperweld immunity
were involved when it said that "the pricing policy challenged here
amounts to little more than price setting by a single entity-albeit
within the context of a joint venture-and not a pricing agreement
between competing entities with respect to their competing
products." 263 In describing the facts of the case and how antitrust law
treats joint ventures, the Court explained that
Texaco and Shell Oil shared in the profits of Equilon's activities in their role as
investors, not competitors. When "persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit ... such

2134c (criticizing the use of the per se rule in Sealy and Topco); see also United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 361 n.2 (Harlan J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of market power in Sealy)
Topco, 405 U.S. at 600 (discussing same in Topco).
261. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(applying this approach to a nationwide moving company, which was owned by local moving
companies and that imposed geographic restraints on the latter); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City
Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying this approach to an ancillary market division
agreement in a shopping mall).
262. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
263. Id. at 6.
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joint ventures [are] regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the
2 64
market."

Finally, in its holding the Court concluded that "[a]s a single
entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to
determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the
discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single,
unified price. ''265 All of these passages seem to suggest that the
decisions made through the joint venture were those of a single entity
and therefore beyond the reach of Section One.
Despite these careless references to the single entity issue, the
opinion ultimately treats Equilon's activities as the product of
concerted action. First, the actual issue before the Court was when
266
"the per se rule against price fixing applies to ... the joint venture,"
not whether Section One applied. Second, the Court held that
"Equilon's price unification policy" could have been challenged
267
pursuant to the rule of reason.
The Court was correct to treat the decisions of a joint venture
as concerted action under Section One. Considering substance over
form, a joint venture may legally be a distinct entity, but its actions
are still subject to Section One scrutiny. The Court in American
Needle held that it is not "determinative that two legally distinct
entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a
structured joint venture. ''268 Texaco and Shell Oil's cooperative
conduct through their joint venture must be subject to antitrust
review or else illegal cartels could evade antitrust liability.
The fact that a joint venture, like Equilon, serves a
coordinating function does not remove its decisions from the reach of
Section One. Antitrust legality will turn on what precisely the joint
venture is coordinating. The DagherCourt presumed that Equilon was
"a lawful joint venture," suggesting that if it were "a sham" then it
could have been per se illegal. 269 The legitimacy of Equilon's role as
coordinator removed the joint venture from the per se category; it did
not eliminate Section One scrutiny altogether.
Finally, the members of the joint venture were not bound like a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. The only thing

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. (quoting Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982)).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010).
Dagher, 547 U.S. at 6.

20111

THE FIRMAS CARTEL MANAGER

867

that stopped Texaco and Shell Oil from competing was the agreement,
but this does not make them incapable of conspiring. 270 Texaco and
Shell Oil could make their own pricing decisions on their branded
gasoline; instead they have each decided to make the decisions
through Equilon. Each could unilaterally exit the relationship.
3. MasterCard and Visa
Historically, the MasterCard and Visa bank credit card
271
associations were organized as joint ventures among issuing banks.
For most banks the venture limited only a small portion of their
activities, namely those involving the issuance of bank charge cards,
and finding a single entity for the venture as a whole would have been
absurd.2 7 2 Under this structure both the Visa and MasterCard joint
ventures faced antitrust litigation aimed at a variety of practices,
including an agreement under which member banks in each venture
were forbidden from issuing competitors' cards, but with an exception
for one another. 273 Thus, for example, a bank issuing a Visa card was
forbidden from issuing a Discover card but it could issue a
MasterCard. This restraint on the issuing of others' cards was
274
unsuccessfully challenged by Discover as a concerted refusal to deal.
Later litigation by the U.S. government proved more successful,
275
however.
There have also been challenges to card issuer agreements
setting the interchange and merchant acceptance fees that finance
credit card transactions, 276 and to the "all cards" policy that requires

270. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214-15 ("Apart from their agreement to cooperate in
exploiting those assets, including their decisions as NFLP, there would be nothing to prevent
each of the teams from making its own market decisions relating to purchases of apparel and
headwear, to the sale of such items, and to the granting of licenses to use its trademarks.").
271. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1994).
272. Id. at 960-61.
273. See, e.g., id. (addressing whether Visa's refusal to admit Sears to its joint venture
restrains trade in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act).
274. Id. (refusing to condemn exclusivity rules that enabled Visa and MasterCard to be
issued by one another's banks but excluded rival cards such as Discover and American Express;
to the extent it is relevant, one of the authors was consulted by the plaintiff).
275. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (condemning
governance duality and exclusivity rules under rule of reason; to the extent it is relevant, one of
the authors was consulted by the government); see also Discover Fin. Servs. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
No. 04-CV-7844, 2008 WL 4067445 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008) (denying summary judgment on
claim by Discover, issuer of a rival card).
276. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.
1986) (applying rule of reason and refusing to condemn the fees).
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those accepting Visa or MasterCard credit cards to also take that
firm's debit cards.2 7 7 This Article does not consider the
"reasonableness," or antitrust legality, of any of these practices, but
only whether they should be regarded as unilateral or
278
conspiratorial.
Both MasterCard and Visa have substantially reorganized,
changing their structure from a contractual joint venture agreement
among independent, issuing member banks to a corporation in which
these issuing banks are shareholders with very limited voting rights.
For example, in the MasterCard venture, Class A shares, with full
voting rights, were issued to the public in an IPO and are publicly
traded. 279 Banks that issue MasterCards are not permitted to hold
Class A shares, at least for a defined time period. 28 0 Issuing banks, by

277. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005)
(describing settlement); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d
Cir. 2001) (certifying class action by large retailers).
278. On the legality question, see DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH
PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the
evolution of the credit card industry and defending the position of credit card associations
against antitrust claims); Dennis W. Carlton & Alan Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit
Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643 (1995) (discussing the potential for anticompetitive harm
to result from collective action by members of credit card joint ventures); Adam J. Levitin,
Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card MerchantRestraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321 (2008)
(arguing that merchant restraints should be banned as antitrust violations); Timothy J.
Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of Two-Sided
Markets, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 515, 517-18 (discussing the economics of two-sided markets);
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of
Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002) (analyzing the cooperative
determination of the interchange fee by member banks in a payment card association); Todd J.
Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 (2000) (dismissing the link between
credit cards and the bankruptcy crisis); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Economics
of InterchangeFees and Their Regulation: An Overview (MIT Sloan, Working Paper No. 4548-05,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=744705 (analyzing whether policy makers should
regulate interchange fees); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees
and the Limits of Regulation (George Mason Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10-26,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1624002 (arguing against
interchange fee regulation); see also U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT ON CREDIT
CARDS 44-45 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1045.pdf (discussing drawbacks
of interchange fee regulation).
279. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCardIPO: Protecting the PricelessBrand, 12 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 137, 145 (2007) (tracing development of MasterCard IPO); see also Adam J. Levitin,
Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 425, 463-67 (2007). See generally Robert E. Litan & Alex J. Pollock, The Future of Charge
Card Networks 6 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 06-03, 2006)
(discussing the reorganization of MasterCard and Visa). MasterCard, Inc. trades on the New
York Stock Exchange under the symbol 4A," and Visa, Inc. trades under the symbol "V."
280. Fleischer, supra note 279, at 145.
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contrast, hold Class B shares, which have no voting rights. 28 1 A third
set of shares, Class M, are also held by member banks and have no
voting rights with respect to routine business, although they do have
veto power over major transactions that will affect the structure of the
28 3
firm or its share classes. 28 2 The Visa structure is roughly similar.
These seemingly odd schemes stand on its head the dual class
voting structure found in some corporations. Typically when a
corporation has two classes of voting shares the intent is to give
insiders a greater amount of control than is manifested by their
percentage ownership. For example, the Google, Inc. structure was
designed to keep control of the corporation among its founders. 28 4 Ford
Motor Company's voting structure gives members of the Ford family
approximately forty percent of the company's votes even though they
own only six percent of its stock. 28 5 In MasterCard, Inc. and Visa, Inc.,
by contrast, the member banks, while having only a minority stake,
are also ongoing participants in the credit card business as
independent firms, although they have effectively relinquished their
voting rights. The likely explanation for this strategy is that the
participants were seeking to limit antitrust exposure by ceding
"control" to a single firm with diverse, inactive shareholders, as
opposed to a joint venture in which decisions were made by active
participants. The intended result would be that the IPOs would be
treated as single entities for antitrust purposes rather than as
28 6
collaborations involving agreements among rivals.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Visa, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 26 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://investor.visa.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=215693&p=proxy (explaining that class B and C shares
have no voting rights). In the Visa, Inc. IPO, Class B shareholders are financial institutions
issuing Visa cards in the United States, while Class C shares are similar institutions in Canada.
See GOLDMAN

SACHs FIN. INST. GROUP, VISA IPO

(2008), http://www.sharpeinvesting.com

2008/01/visa-ipo-goldman-sachs-financial-institutions-group.html (discussing Visa's organization
as an IPO).
284. In the Google, Inc. IPO, Class A shares were entitled to one vote each but class B shares
received ten votes. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 802-03 (2007) (describing Google structure as leaving outside investors largely
powerless).
285. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 3047, 3066 (2009) (noting that as of 1998, the Ford family owned six percent of shares but
controlled forty percent of votes).
286. Some authors have noted that this was very likely an intended result of the switch from
a joint venture to a corporate structure. In addition to Fleischer, supra note 279, see Joshua D.
Wright, The MasterCardIPO: MasterCard'sSingle Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 225
(2007) (expanding on Fleischer's analysis of the antitrust implications of MasterCard's new
governance structure).
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Whatever the economics, the legal implications of shifting the
analysis from multilateral to unilateral conduct can be significant.
Most importantly, the agreements among member banks in the old
joint ventures not to permit issuance of rival cards such as Discover
would be treated as a concerted refusal to deal, which could be
unlawful per se if naked or, more likely, addressed under the rule of
reason if found to be an ancillary restraint. 2 7 By contrast, if a single
firm issuing a MasterCard or Visa bank card refused to carry a rival's
brands, the conduct would have to be analyzed as a unilateral refusal
to sell a rival's goods, which entails virtual per se legality. 28 8 Under
the joint venture analysis, agreements on merchant acceptance and
other transfer fees would be price agreements for that portion of the
fee that the banks agreed to charge, and would generally be treated as
ancillary to the joint venture's business and addressable under the
rule of reason. 28 9 Under single firm analysis, any fee on a transfer
from one subsidiary bank to another would be a unilateral act. The
agreed upon portion of any fee arrangement with merchants would be
collaborative, but that agreement would be vertical rather than
horizontal and almost certainly legal. The "all-cards" policy, requiring
merchants who wish to take a credit card to take that brand's debit
cards as well, would be assessed under the law of tying arrangements,
which are ordinarily unilaterally imposed. 290 However, under the joint
venture structure, they would have to be regarded as a collusive
agreement among the upstream firms to engage in tying, which could
invoke harsher antitrust treatment. 29 1 Finally, within the joint
venture structure the business relationship with the shareholder
member banks is one of seller or buyer; that is, the IPOs treat the
banks as their "customers," to whom they provide card issuance and
management services. Formally these would count as purely vertical

287. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing
the government's claim under a rule of reason); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958
(10th Cir. 1994).
288. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004); see
also 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, 1 772-73 (discussing unilateral refusals to deal
and "essential facility" doctrine).
289. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.
1986) (applying rule of reason analysis instead of per se analysis to Visa's conduct).
290. Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773 (1999) (arguing that most tying
arrangements are essentially unilateral).
291. Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247 (2007)
(advocating per se illegality for tying conspiracies).
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relationships between the IPO as seller and each individual bank as
purchaser.
The problem can now be viewed this way: suppose a group of
banks organize a corporation with two classes of shares. One class is
publicly traded and has full voting rights. The other class has no
voting rights with respect to day-to-day business, and its ownership is
limited to the participating banks. Each of these banks is a separately
owned firm, and the relationship between the banks and the central
firm is that of shareholder and firm rather than parent and
subsidiary. In this regime the directors and managers are answerable
to the shareholders and they generally operate under the constraint
that they must maximize the value of the firm; however, the value of
the firm is largely a function of the aggregate value of the credit card
business engaged in by the individual shareholder banks.
This organization effectively uses the corporate form as a cartel
or joint venture manager. Management's obligation to maximize firm
value can be carried out by actions that increase profits because they
are efficient and output expanding-that is, they might reduce costs,
produce a superior product, or otherwise attract trade. Alternatively,
they might increase profits because they reduce market output in a
market where the firm has power, and thus enable higher prices or
margins. If this were truly unilateral conduct, antitrust would largely
be indifferent to the output reduction effects because a single firm is
free to reduce output and raise prices as it pleases.
Even though the banks are not voting decisionmakers in the
firm, any rule that limits their individual behavior must be regarded
as multilateral under the American Needle analysis. As a result,
anticompetitive collusion would be reachable just as much as
anticompetitive exclusion. Of course, the firm might engage in many
other activities that have no impact at all on the member banks'
separate business. For example, Visa, Inc. might decide to purchase a
toaster manufacturer and operate it as a subsidiary, or it might decide
to build a new office building for its corporate headquarters. As long
as such a decision had no impact on how the individual shareholder
banks conduct their business, it would be regarded as unilateral. By
contrast, any decision that limited the ability of shareholders to
compete in their separate business would be addressable under
Section One of the Sherman Act.
In sum, the MasterCard and Visa IPOs have the characteristics
of centrally managed cartels. In substance, the central organization
has the power to control the independent business of the individual
issuing shareholders. The individual members have the ability to
withdraw, which they can accomplish by selling their shares and
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dropping the card. Further, it is unnecessary that the individual
issuing banks coordinate their behavior with one another; the central
organization solves that problem. Control runs from the organization
to the individual members, limiting their independent business
activity with respect to the issuance and management of bank cards.
Legitimate reasons may have existed for the MasterCard and
Visa IPOs. For example, a stronger central organization may have
292
enhanced the cards' brand image as a safe and secure brand.
However, the unusual "inverted" dual governance structure must have
resulted from giving exaggerated importance to formal "control"
within collaborative associations. In any event, that decision was
based on too subjective a view of control. Once the boards of the
MasterCard and Visa IPOs were in place, their goal was to maximize
firm profits, and they were as suited to accomplishing this task as any
cartel ringleader, whether or not a functioning member of the cartel
itself.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's opinion in American Needle provides an
opportunity to examine the connection between cartel theory and the
single entity question in antitrust. Many successful cartels function by
taking control away from individual members and giving it to a single
organization. A business organization such as a corporation becomes
an ideal vehicle for cartel management. Understanding how cartels
actually operate can help courts distinguish between a legitimate
single entity and a centralized cartel structure subject to Section One
liability.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the rule of
reason remains for joint ventures among separate business entities
that have significant integrative potential. While both unilateral
conduct and ancillary collaborative conduct are treated under the rule
of reason, however, the conduct standard differs. Under Section Two of
the Sherman Act, a single firm is responsible only for its unreasonably
exclusionary practices directed against rivals or potential rivals. By
contrast, under Section One, a cartel or joint venture is answerable in
antitrust when its members unreasonably reduce output and increase
price, whether or not there is actionable exclusionary conduct.
As the history of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
indicates, that doctrine was developed in a milieu in which per se
292. See Fleischer, supranote 279 (making this argument about the MasterCard IPO).
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rules were much more aggressive and of significantly broader scope
than they are today. Too broad a finding of "conspiracy" inside a
traditional business firm could mean that perfectly benign business
behavior might become an antitrust violation. But the last twenty-five
years has seen a considerable contraction of per se rules and broad
expansion of the rule of reason. In cases such as American Needle,
Topco, and Seely, which involve both corporate restraints imposed on
independent firms and joint ventures with significant integrative
potential, the soundest approach is to view them as involving both
collaborative activity and ancillary restraints-situations for which
antitrust's rule of reason is appropriate. Courts should evaluate the
anticompetitive effects of resulting restraints, not immunize them
from antitrust liability through the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine.

